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ABSTRACT
Matthew Reese, a professional political consultant from West Virginia, worked on numerous
major campaigns in the latter part of the twentieth century and transformed the profession.
Scholars have studied and written about the increasing role of professional political consultants
since their emergence in the mid twentieth century, but no scholarship has been dedicated to
Matthew Reese. This analysis of Reese and his legacy examines the impact that he has had on
political consulting from serving in a key advisory role for John Kennedy’s 1960 West Virginia
Primary campaign, to creating his own political firm, being the first to use computer software to
assist in data collection and campaign and leaving behind an impressive pedigree of consultants
that continue to use similar methodology today.

v

INTRODUCTION
When Matthew Reese passed away in 1998, The Washington Post heralded him as a
“godfather of the professional political consulting business.”1 Reese entered the political fray in
the 1950s, but it was not until after his work as Executive Director of Citizens for Kennedy in
West Virginia during John Kennedy’s 1960 presidential campaign that he became a prominent
figure in professional political consulting. By the time he sold his political consulting firm in
1987 and went into retirement, he had worked with numerous presidents, senators, governors,
mayors, campaigns in Latin America and private companies such as AT&T.2 Yet, despite being a
pioneer in the field, little scholarship exists on Matthew Reese and the few that do exist he is not
the focus of. Political historians, while acknowledging Reese’s contributions, have not devoted
scholarship to him. The current scholarship that exists looks at the field, its methods and history
in a broad scope. This thesis represents an expansion on the studies of political consulting by
focusing on an individual who influenced what it is now.
This study concurs with The Washington Post that Reese is the godfather of modern
political consulting. Matthew Reese not only helped pioneer political consulting into the modern
era, but he also helped bridge the field as it moved away from political machines and party
bosses typical of the nineteenth century into the super precise polling and data consulting that it
is today. He identified hardcore voters, those who always go to the polls no matter the candidates
or issues, and softcore voters, people who only went to the polls during an election that they

1

Bart Barnes, “Matt Reese, Veteran Political Consultant, Dies at 71,” Washington Post, December 3, 1998,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/campaigns/junkie/links/reese.htm.
2

Sharron Warren Walsh, “British Marketing Group Buys 2 Area PR Firms,” Washington Post,
August 28, 1987, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1987/08/28/british-marketing-group-buys-2area-pr-firms/b9565e3d-51b5-49aa-a14e-53d65d7e9a9e/.
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were interested in such as a presidential election.3 As the Computer Age dawned in the later part
of the twentieth century, Reese embraced the new technology and methods, again ushering in
change in the political world. In 1978, Reese became the first political consultant to use
computer software to assist him in his work. The program, Claritas, allowed for precise
technique in pinpointing supporters and opponents of issues or candidates.4 Furthermore, Reese
trained many political consultants, and his influence is felt through work using similar
methodologies that he championed.
During the nineteenth century, political machines and their bosses dominated politics. A
political machine is an organization that sought to get and maintain votes and control of the
political entity they ran for. Famous examples include Tammany Hall of New York headed by
infamous party boss William “Boss” Tweed. By 1890 every major city had a political boss or
were in the process of developing one.5 The bosses organized neighborhoods, balanced tickets
and in exchange for one’s loyalty offered patronage to get and hold onto power.6
This spoils system and the power of machines waned as the twentieth century dawned.
Patronage was effectively outlawed in 1883 by the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act.7 The
new merit-based system came in the aftermath of President James A. Garfield’s assassination.

3

Dennis W. Johnson, Democracy for Hire: A History of American Political Consulting (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2017), 197.
4

Rudy Maxa, “Can Matt Reese and a System Called Claritas Answer the Prayers of Democrats
Everywhere? The Search for Votes Is Never Ending,” Washington Post, July 22, 1979.
5

William V. Shannon, “The Political Machine I: Rise and Fall the Age of The Bosses,” American Heritage
20, no. 4, June 1969.
6

William V. Shannon, “The Political Machine I: Rise and Fall the Age of The Bosses.”

7

U.S. Congress, 1883, “An Act to regulate and improve the civil service of the United States, January 16,
1883.” [Pendleton Act], Milestone Documents, National Archives and Record Administration, accessed June 20,
2002, https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/pendleton-act.
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Charles Guiteau murdered President Garfield on the false belief that his support of Garfield was
critical and thus he was deserving of a job. The reform brought federal appointments away from
how the Jacksonian era spoils system that dominated the nineteenth century operated and closer
to how they operate today on a merit system.8
While political machines declined, political consulting began to grow, filling the void that
the machines left behind. The first political-consulting firm created was Campaigns Inc., founded
in 1933 by Clem Whitaker and Leone Baxter.9 The two worked together to put out an
information campaign that attacked novelist and Democratic candidate for governor in
California, Upton Sinclair. Like how machines operated, they wrote and conveyed messages to
the voters trying to earn their vote. Sinclair claimed he lost because his opponent had the Lie
Factory working for them, taking lines that Sinclair wrote in his works of fiction and citing them
as if Sinclair said it himself in a serious manner, out of story, out of character.10 Politics had
turned into a business. The duo started with print advertising, but as technology advanced, so did
the changes in politics. In 1920, KDKA in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania became the first radio station
to air presidential election results. The next election, 1924, national political conventions were
broadcasted by radio.
Baxter believed that until campaigns began to turn towards political consulting and
management that campaigns were “the natural province of broken-down politicians and camp

8

U.S. Congress, 1883. “An Act to regulate and improve the civil service of the United States, January 16,
1883.” [Pendleton Act]
9

Jill Lepore, “How Politics Became a Business,” The New Yorker, September 17, 2012,
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/09/24/the-lie-factory.
10

Jill Lepore, “How Politics Became a Business.”
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followers.”11 Political scientist Edward M. Sait observed in 1927 that running for office had
turned into a great selling campaign and that parties compete like a manufacturer of breakfast
foods or shaving cream and present their case through newspapers and magazines.12
It was not until the 1950s when others realized the work that Baxter and Whitaker were
doing in California would pay dividends if they adopted similar practices and decided to enter
the fray themselves.13 Reese was one of the first to enter the consulting field outside of
California in the post-World War II world. In the early days, Reese used data to decide where to
go, who to target and how to target. By the time he retired, he was the first in the business to rely
on computer programs and their algorithms to help identify, energize, and get voters on their
side.
Historians have only recently begun to dissect the impact that the political consultants of
the mid to late twentieth century had. The first scholarly work on political consulting, The Rise of
Political Consultants: New Ways of Winning, came from Dr. Larry Sabato in 1981. Sabato is a
political science professor at the University of Virginia and is the founder and director of the
University of Virginia Center for Politics.14 “There is no more significant change in the conduct

11

Stanley Kelly, Professional Public Relations and Political Power. (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1956).
12

Johnson, Democracy for Hire: A History of American Political Consulting, 57.
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Jill Lepore, “Political Consulting and The ‘Lie Factory,’ interview by Audie Cornish, All Things
Considered, NPR, September 19, 2012, audio, 5:45, https://www.npr.org/2012/09/19/161436246/politicalconsulting-and-the-lie-factory.
14

“Larry J. Sabato,” University of Virginia, accessed June 29, 2022,
https://politics.virginia.edu/people/profile/ljs.
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of campaigns than the consultants’ recent rise to prominence, if not preeminence, during the
election season,” Sabato argued.15
More contemporary sources on the subject were published in the 2010s. John Hopkins
University political science professor, Adam Sheingate, published Building a Business of
Politics: The Rise of Political Consulting and the Transformation of American Democracy
(Studies in Postwar American Political Development) in 2015. His work focused on the field’s
explosion in use and importance after World War II. Former political consultant and Professor
Emeritus at the George Washington University Graduate School of Political Management,
Dennis W. Johnson published his book Democracy for Hire: A History of American Political
Consulting in 2016. Johnson contextualized the history of political consulting and into what it
had evolved. While both works contribute to the historiography, they evaluate political
consulting. This scholarship builds upon the historiography by providing a perspective of the
life, style, and tactics of one man who did grow political consulting.
The research in this thesis is backed up by Matthew Reese’s own personal collection. In
the 1970s and 1980s, Reese began to donate his personal papers, call sheets, voter data,
campaign materials, etc., that his firm collected on campaigns to the John F. Kennedy
Presidential Library and Museum in Boston. The archives there housed his work for decades
until the mid-2010s when it transferred the collection to Marshall University Special Collections.
Since the collection’s move to Marshall, it has grown in material with additional donations made
by Reese’s wife and surviving family.

15

Larry J. Sabato, The Rise of Political Consultants: New Ways of Winning Elections (New York, NY:
Basic Books, 1987), 3.
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Along with Reese’s own papers and data, the research pulls information from
government data as well. Data from the Census Bureau is used extensively and paired with
election data from Reese’s internal numbers or election results from the National Archives.
The research also contains numerous oral histories conducted by the John F. Kennedy
Presidential Library. These interviews were done by oral historian William L. Young in the mid1960s. The interviews concern President Kennedy and those who collaborated with him. One
such interviewee is Matthew Reese himself, detailing his time and work with the president. Other
interviewees such as Kennedy campaign workers Robert P. McDonough, Andrew Houvouras,
and Bob Myers recount their perspective of Kennedy, the campaign and even Reese himself.
Included with the oral histories are also speeches from politicians such as President Kennedy
from the campaign trail and at political events.
Newspaper articles from publications such as The New York Times and The Washington
Post are also used in the research. These articles offer a glimpse into how the news of these
events were perceived at the time that they occurred. They also highlight opinions of those that
shared them in editorials. Publications like WV Metro News and news clips from news channel
WSAZ local to Reese’s home are also used to better show the impact that Reese had on his
hometown and state.
The first chapter serves as an introduction to political consulting and Matthew Reese.
This chapter defines what a political consultant is and what they do. It provides the history of the
field as it grew out of declining party machines and into the media empire that it is now. It also
provides the background to Matthew Reese and his life; how the young man from Huntington,
West Virginia, got his start in the political world and ended up collaborating with leaders of the
Democratic Party throughout the latter part of the twentieth century.
6

Chapter Two examines the 1960 West Virginia Democratic Primary. Plenty of
scholarship exists on the primary and the 1960 presidential election. However, this chapter
maintains a focus on Reese and his work on the campaign. As Executive Director of Citizens for
Kennedy in West Virginia, Reese and his team worked out of a hotel in Charleston up to
eighteen hours a day. There they employed mass telephone campaigns to contact voters which
was a first of its kind. Additionally, Reese was a key advisor for the Kennedy campaign,
suggesting how the campaign could overcome the issue of Kennedy’s Catholicism and frosty
reception from labor unions. This chapter argues that Reese helped made Kennedy and his
campaign successful and ushered in the political consulting that experts, such as Sabato, believe
was the most momentous change in how campaigns are conducted.
Reese’s work after his time with President Kennedy and his legacy is the subject of
Chapter Three. Reese moved to Washington D.C. after Kennedy’s victory to continue his
consulting career. He received a job with the Democratic National Committee and spearheaded
the DNC’s voter registration drives, adding four million voters to the registration lists. Then he
founded his firm Matt Reese & Associates, which later became Reese Communications
Companies Inc. With his firm, Reese advanced the field into the modern age by being one of the
first consultants to use the computer in processing data and using hyper-precise targeting to
identify trends within neighborhoods and producing unique targeting for that cluster through a
process known as geodemography. Many important political consultants in the last part of the
twentieth century and into the twenty-first century got their start working for Reese, and their
styles and tactics emulate Reese’s. Also, Reese’s employment of women helped made the maledominated field more accepting of women workers and those in leadership roles.

7

The conclusion examines the legacy that Matthew Reese, his work, and methods has left
on politics and political consulting. Political consulting is even more engaging today than it was
in Reese’s time thanks to the advent of tools such as social media and the 24/7 news cycle that
allows a politician or campaign to constantly remain in contact with voters. A smartphone user
might hear a political ad while on Spotify or might see a political ad while searching through
Google today. These ads are made, evaluated, and designed with that type of user in mind. This
is the natural evolution of how political consultants reach their intended audience. The
conclusion makes clear that Reese was a major contributing factor to how political consulting is
today.
This study is an essential expansion of the scholarship that exists on professional political
consulting. By examining Matthew Reese, his methodology and his impact, this thesis makes the
case that Reese has shaped political consulting into what it is now. The profession makes heavy
use of personalized advertisements that target precise audiences through the usage of data
gathered from computer software. Reese is the first to use such software. Since his time with the
Kennedy campaign in West Virginia, he showed how effective personalization is when engaging
with prospective voters.

8

CHAPTER ONE:
POLITCAL CONSULTING AND MATTHEW REESE

The twentieth century saw the emergence of political consulting as a professional career
and an increasingly important part of the electoral process. The growth of professional political
consulting was a natural evolution of politics after the decline of party bosses and the growth of
mass media in the twentieth century. Mathew Reese was a major figure in this creation and
continued evolution of professional political consulting. Reese’s life, education, participation in
John Kennedy’s 1960 primary in West Virginia, and continued adoption of the latest
campaigning technology played critical roles in preparing him to revolutionize political
campaigning and consulting. Because of his forward thinking, Reese helped Kennedy win the
crucial West Virginia primary. He later became the first leading political consultant to adopt
computer software and new practices for consulting. These practices and software are
commonplace in today’s political consulting. These accomplishments make him an important
figure in modern political consulting.
A native of Huntington, West Virginia, Matthew Reese was born in 1927.16 Reese was
brought up as a Republican, typical of the time as the Democrats had only won West Virginia
once in the presidential elections during the twentieth century up to his birth.17 His family voted
exclusively for the Republican Party.18 At age eighteen, Reese was drafted into military service

16

Shauna Johnson, “Papers From ‘Godfather’ of Political Consulting Now Housed at Marshall
University,” WV MetroNews, October 31, 2016, https://wvmetronews.com/2016/10/31/papers-from-godfather-ofpolitical-consulting-now-housed-at-marshall-university/.
17

Shauna Johnson, “Papers From ‘Godfather’ of Political Consulting Now Housed at Marshall
University.”
18

John Houvouras, “The Godfather,” The Huntington Quarterly, 1995,

9

and returned to Huntington at the conclusion of his service.
He grew up with an interest in politics, but when he enrolled into Marshall College (now
Marshall University) he did not have an idea of what he wanted to do.19 Growing up, he was
interested in getting and maintaining good grades, but did not care much for the learning part of
school.20 He recalled that growing up in Huntington the information of the outside world was
limited and the extent of his knowledge came from school and the local newspapers.21 Despite
the aimless feeling, he majored in political science and minored in philosophy.
At Marshall, Reese met instructors Conley Dillon and M.G. “Bernie” Burnside. The two
political science instructors influenced Reese a great deal and inspired him to seek a career in
politics. His politics were also shaped during his time at Marshall. He learned about and later met
Walter Reuther, the president of the United Auto Workers. Reuther was one of the twentieth
century’s most prolific leaders for organized labor. He was an advocate in collective bargaining,
workplace safety, worker education and enhancement, healthcare, retirement, and life balance
benefits and was named by Time magazine as one of the most influential people of the twentieth
century.22 Inspired by instructors, liberal politics and politicians of the time, Reese sought a
career in politics.

http://www.jackhouvouras.com/portfolio/biographies/matt-reese.
19

John Houvouras, “The Godfather.”

20

John Houvouras, “The Godfather.”

21

John Houvouras, “The Godfather.”

22

Rory Gamble, “In Tribute: Walter Reuther's Impact Endures and Teaches.,” UAW, May 9, 2020,
https://uaw.org/tribute-walter-reuthers-impact-endures-teaches/.
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While Reese began his storied political career, the field of political consulting emerged
within California politics. Upton Sinclair, author of The Jungle, launched his campaign to be
California’s governor with a novella about “a true story of the future.”23 I, Governor of
California, and How I Ended Poverty, was a different type of alternative history. It told a story
from the future where Sinclair was successful in his bid for governor and by re-election time in
1938, he had eradicated poverty in the state. Sinclair, a Socialist running as a Democrat, won the
Democratic nomination in August 1934. This came as a shock to everyone as he won with more
votes than any primary candidate in California had ever won before, almost all hundred and
twenty seats in the state legislature were held by Republicans and it happened exactly how
Sinclair penned in I, Governor of California, and How I Ended Poverty.24 Sinclair’s unlikely rise
prompted the candidate for Republican lieutenant governor to hire Clem Whitaker and Leone
Baxter to attack Sinclair. The duo formed the first professional political consulting firm in
history, Campaigns Inc., and then locked themselves away in their house for three days, reading
all of Sinclair’s works, speeches, and statements. They devised a plan to use his work outside of
their original context to attack Sinclair. The work that the two did together is the first
professional political consulting of its kind and served as a natural progression of politics after
the decline of party bosses and machines of the nineteenth century. Both journalist Sidney
Blumenthal and political scientist Larry Sabato agree that political consulting became the
dominant force within the political system, replacing party bosses.25

23

Upton Sinclair, I, Governor of California, and How I Ended Poverty (Los Angeles, CA: End Poverty
League, 1934), 1.
24

Jill Lepore, “How Politics Became a Business.”

25

Adam Sheingate, Building a Business of Politics: The Rise of Political Consulting and the
Transformation of American Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 153.
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Political machines controlled urban politics. A party machine was present in nearly every
major city. These machines, often through a patronage or spoils system, used their influence and
money to further grow their power over the people and neighborhoods in its control. The
machines tailored their message to their audience and even to the geographic area that they were
working in. As the Progressive Era dawned, this way of doing politics grew increasingly
unpopular. The most famous political machine and its boss, William “Boss” Tweed of Tammany
Hall in New York City came under the crosshairs of The New York Times. The New York Times
publisher and founder, George Jones, was offered a $5 million bribe if The New York Times
stopped their digging into Tweed.26 Jones refused and continued publishing damning stories on
Tweed and his circle.
On July 29, 1871, The New York Times ran their article “How New York is Governed:
Frauds of the Tammany Democrats.” It was so popular that it sold more than 500,000 copies
including a German-language version.27 The German publication of The New York Times was a
first for the paper. German Americans were a distinct ethnic group in New York City and had
supported Tweed and his machine. By publishing the exposé in German, it allowed the very
people being taken advantage of by Tweed’s machine to see the evidence and to garner support
behind municipal reform.28 The German article was an early modern example of targeting a
specific audience to get political messaging across, a tactic Reese would later champion. Reese,

26

David Dunlap, “A Happy 200th to The Times’s First Publisher, Whom Boss Tweed Couldn’t Buy or
Kill,” New York Times, August 16, 2011, https://archive.nytimes.com/cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/ahappy-200th-to-the-timess-first-publisher-whom-boss-tweed-couldnt-buy-or-kill/.
27

David Dunlap, “1871 | To Skewer Boss Tweed, The Times Spoke German,” New York Times, May 25,
2015, https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/times-insider/2015/05/25/1871-to-skewer-boss-tweed-thetimes-spoke-german/.
28

David Dunlap, “1871 | To Skewer Boss Tweed, The Times Spoke German,”
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however, attempted to reach his audience through grassroots campaigns such as telephone blitzes
or mass mailings.
Tweed’s downfall, President Garfield’s assassination a decade later in 1881, and the
emergence of the Progressive Era served as the death kneel for political machines. Charles
Guiteau assassinated President James Garfield, believing that his work helped get Garfield
elected and thus was deserving of a job. This thought process was not an uncommon one at the
time as the nation’s politics operated on a spoils system.29 Garfield’s assassination resulted in the
passage of the Pendleton Act in 1883. The act provided that federal government jobs be awarded
based on merit and that government employees be selected through competitive exams. It also
made it unlawful for one to be fired or demoted for political reasons.30 The Prohibition
movement also grew in the late nineteenth century which Progressives at the same time were in
support of. Some were for it out of religious motivation, but others sought to bring on Prohibition
to diminish the power that local bosses had on bars.31 Even after the repeal of Prohibition,
political bosses and their machines did not return to the same power that they once had.
Despite Whitaker and Baxter being the first professional political consultants, they
remained alone in the political realm. Several advising firms appeared in California during the
late 1940s and 1950s, but none had the reach that Campaigns Inc. had. The other firms that did
work in politics, most of whom were former workers for Campaigns Inc. such as Harry Lerner,
Thomas Page, and Robert Alderman, worked on smaller projects such as city campaigns in San

29

The spoils system dominated American politics until the late nineteenth century. A political party or
politician awarded its supporters government jobs once they won the election.
30

U.S. Congress, 1883. “An Act to regulate and improve the civil service of the United States, January 16,
1883.” [Pendleton Act]
31

James H. Timberlake, Prohibition and the Progressive Movement: 1900-1920. (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard Univ. Press), 1963.
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Francisco.32 It was a prelude to Matthew Reese and his work with John Kennedy, the Democratic
National Convention, and later his own firm. Like Whitaker and Baxter, Reese worked on
numerous campaigns with media blitzes to get the vote out. He began his work at the time when
others realized they could emulate Whitaker and Baxter’s work from California and apply it
elsewhere to national politics to create a perpetual campaign. He had access to newer
technologies that allowed him to reach an audience even greater than Campaigns Inc. by being
one of the early adopters of the computer.
At age twenty-six in 1954, Reese got his first opportunity to work in electoral politics
when his former instructor, Bernie Burnside, ran for the House of Representatives in West
Virginia. Burnside left his faculty role at Marshall College to run for Congress and was
successful but lost his seat in 1952.33 However, Burnside ran again in 1954 and was successful in
winning his seat back. Reese volunteered for the Burnside campaign and then traveled to
Washington D.C. with Burnside and worked as an administrative assistant for two years until
Burnside’s second and final defeat.34 Jack Houvouras, a freelance writer based out of
Huntington, West Virginia, chronicled that the experience was not a monumental awakening for
Reese, but it did provide the impetus for future political involvement.35
Without a job in D.C., Reese returned home to West Virginia and worked for his father.
He devoted his free time to the Young Democrats and became their executive secretary. “I sold

32

Johnson, Democracy for Hire a History of American Political Consulting, 36.

33

“BURNSIDE, Maurice Gwinn,” History, Art & Archives, U.S. House of Representatives, accessed July
5, 2022, https://history.house.gov/People/Detail/10230.
34

John Houvouras, “The Godfather.”

35

John Houvouras, “The Godfather.”
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insurance, I sold Britannicas, I sold cars for my father. I needed to do that to make a living until I
met John Kennedy,” remembered Reese.36 While Reese worked in D.C., the two met by chance
on the Capitol steps and spoke briefly. Reese admired the Senator. “He had a great attractiveness
as a candidate. As someone who has been interested in politics, I was naturally attracted to him,”
Reese recalled in a 1964 interview with William Young for the John F. Kennedy Library.37 The
two did not have further interactions until Kennedy ran for president in 1960.
Reese collaborated with Democrats throughout West Virginia during his time with the
Young Democrats. He traveled throughout the state to train election workers.38 While the work
was minuscule compared to the work that Reese later did, it did provide him with the
connections necessary to jumpstart his political career. Through the training sessions he
conducted, Reese met Robert McDonough, a political strategist from Parkersburg, West
Virginia. McDonough had been a longtime supporter of John Kennedy and was the lone
Kennedy supporter in West Virginia’s delegation in 1956.39
In 1959, Reese received a letter in the mail from the Democratic National Committee
asking which candidate he was supporting.40 A dedicated Democrat, Reese admired Kennedy as

36

Johnson, Democracy for Hire: A History of American Political Consulting, 82.

37

Matthew Reese Jr., interview by William L. Young, October 24, 1964, transcript, John F. Kennedy
Library Oral History Program, Boston, MA, available online at
https://www.jfklibrary.org/sites/default/files/archives/JFKOH/Reese%2C%20Matthew%20A/JFKOH-MAR01/JFKOH-MAR-01-TR.pdf
38

Robert P. McDonough, interview by William L. Young, July 3, 1965, John F. Kennedy Library Oral
History Program, Boston, MA, available online at
https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKOH/McDonough%2C%20Robert%20P/JFKOH-RPM03/JFKOH-RPM-03
39

Thomas Oliphant and Curtis Wilkie, The Road to Camelot: Inside JFK's Five-Year Campaign (New
York,NY: Simon & Schuster, 2017,) 136.
40

Reese, Jr., interview.
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well as his challengers Hubert Humphrey, Adlai Stevenson, and Lyndon Johnson. He selected
John Kennedy because “[Kennedy] looked to me like he was a winner and would make a great
candidate and a great President.”41 It was because Reese was an early backer of Kennedy, he was
among the first to be offered an opportunity to do volunteer work for Kennedy.42 Few in West
Virginia were supportive of Kennedy prior to the election season. Nor were many in West
Virginia aware of the Senator and his stances before then. Reese’s early knowledge and the
backing of Kennedy put him on the campaign’s radar as someone ready and willing to work.
In the winter of 1959, Reese was contacted by Robert McDonough, now the director of
John Kennedy’s primary campaign in West Virginia, to meet with him, Ted Kennedy and Robert
Kennedy and was asked for his opinion on what John Kennedy should do. McDonough felt that
“the consensus…of the working politicians was that the West Virginia primary was a hazard in
that if you won it, you didn’t get anything because the delegate by law were not committed, and
if you lost it, you had a black mark against you.”43 However, Reese believed that “the Senator
ought to come into West Virginia.”44 Despite still just being a volunteer, Reese for the first time
in his career began to advise politicians. Reese invited the two Kennedy brothers and
McDonough to his hometown of Huntington, organized a dinner with local leaders and got Ted
Kennedy airtime on the local stations.45 The leaders and Reese conveyed that it was important to
get Kennedy in the state as soon as possible. The longer they waited, the harder it would become

41

Reese, Jr., interview.
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Reese, Jr., interview.
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Oliphant and Wilkie, The Road to Camelot: Inside JFK's Five-Year, 136.
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Reese, Jr., interview.
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John Houvouras, “The Godfather,”
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to overcome the Catholic issue. The state was almost 95 percent non-Catholic, and some areas
were vehemently anti-Catholic.46 A December 1959 poll by pollster Lou Harris indicated that
Kennedy’s Catholicism “would be a problem in some sections of the border state where hardshell Protestantism makes for strong religious sentiments,” but that Kennedy did poll well among
Protestants and exceptionally well among Catholics.47 Yet, Reese convinced them that West
Virginia was an opportunity. A victory there would put the issue over Kennedy’s Catholicism to
rest.48
The Kennedy campaign was convinced and began operations in West Virginia.
McDonough offered Reese a job and he graduated from volunteer work to paid work.49 He left
working for his father and for the first time since his work with Representative Bernie Burnside,
Reese was on a payroll for a politician as the Executive Director of Citizens for Kennedy in West
Virginia. Reese was offered the job because of how skillful he was as an organizer, and he had a
“personality that allowed him to be quite a harmonizer.”50 He was experienced in the
administrative side of politics. It was what he exclusively worked with while he was in D.C. with
Burnside. Through his volunteer experience throughout the state, Reese learned about the inner
workings of West Virginia politics. For instance, he was aware that in the southern and central
parts of the state, the people enjoy politics and have a good record getting out to vote.51 Those
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areas, he described, “are pretty drab and unexciting,” so bringing a candidate and the issues to
the area brought great excitement and energized the people.52
Reese’s in-depth knowledge of the state was crucial for the Kennedy campaign in 1960.
Slating, the practice of down ballot voting, was common at the time in West Virginia during
primaries. Within each county’s party there are sub-factions and they do not always stay
together. One group gets together for a particular group of candidates and tries to build a slate
from the President down to the Justice of the Peace.53 Attaching oneself to a slate can be the
difference between winning or losing that county. With Reese being hired, the Kennedy
campaign had an inlet for someone who had a pulse of West Virginia voters and knew which
slates would be best to attach themselves to.
Reese oversaw all campaigning and get-out-the-vote efforts in West Virginia, a role he
maintained throughout his career on the various campaigns that he worked on. His methodology
was highly influenced by the O’Brien Manual.54 The manual was a sixty-four-page grassroots
fieldwork and volunteer plan first put together by Kennedy ally, Larry O’Brien, when John
Kennedy ran for Senate in 1952.55 O’Brien broke the campaign down part by part to ensure that
everyone had a role, and they performed that role to the best of their ability. It was adaptable to
different state elections as well as the national election and contained data that was pertinent to
the election that it was being used for.56 The manual consists of two parts. The first part concerns
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State Organizational Procedure and the second part detailed descriptions of various specific
campaign procedures, including “the extremely important telephone, tabloid distribution, and
transportation campaigns.”57 The manual served as a campaign’s framework.
In the first part, the Manual stressed that a committee should be formed to conduct the
election, but that its members are to provide a geographical balance so that the committee does
not favor one area more than the other. These committee members then elect their officers which
were the chair, vice chair, finance chair, publicity chair, treasurer and any other office as may be
locally determined.58 Further into the Manual provided expectations of each position and how
they work with other positions. It had a heavy emphasis on grassroot support, such as young
people knocking on doors and women working the telephones. O’Brien believed that grassroots
efforts provided a competitive edge for a campaign by appealing to everyday people with
everyday people.59
The Manual’s second part detailed recommendations for maintaining a headquarters for
the campaign, how to recruit volunteers and then assign duties to these workers from working the
telephones, to overseeing transportation (driving voters to and from the polls) to campaigning in
the precinct that they work in.60 The location of the headquarters should maintain full-time staff
and, if possible, find vacant stores that are rent free or close to the main business section of

57

Lawrence F. O'Brien Personal Papers, Scrapbooks.

58

Lawrence F. O'Brien Personal Papers, Scrapbooks.

59

Lawrence F. O'Brien Personal Papers, Scrapbooks.

60

Lawrence F. O'Brien Personal Papers, Scrapbooks.

19

towns.61 Much like in the first part where the Manual wanted the representation among officers
balanced the second part required the same thing for volunteers.62
The second part also emphasized the importance of just one vote and how important it is
to get said vote. The version of the Manual used in the 1960 election cited examples from 1954
elections such as the New York Senate race where Averell Harriman defeated Senator Irving
Ives by only a fraction more than one vote per precinct. It also cited a race in Montana where
Senator James Murray was re-elected by one vote per precinct to display just how important it is
to reach and gain every voter possible.63
For the 1960 West Virginia primary, Reese adhered closely to the O’Brien Manual. He
and dozens of volunteers worked up to eighteen hours a day on the telephone campaigning for
John Kennedy.64 He assembled and maintained the organization of Kennedy chairs in forty-five
of the fifty-five counties in West Virginia.65 He also served as the liaison for the in-state
leadership throughout the counties and the out-of-state leadership such as Robert Kennedy, Ted
Kennedy, Larry O’Brien, and Ken O’Donnell.66
A tactic that Reese used at the county level borrowed from the O’Brien Manual was
having his volunteers provide contact lists whether it was club memberships, PTAs or Christmas
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card mailings and created custom letters for the recipients.67 O’Brien first did this in 1952 when
tens of thousands of women received engraved invitations, addressed by hand, to meet Kennedy
and his family.68 It was cost efficient as well. For a particular instance during the West Virginia
primary, 15,000 invitations were sent out and 5,000 people arrived. For the cost it was to rent the
venue, send the mail, and to provide cookies and tea it only came out to be just nineteen cents
per person.69
If an issue arose throughout the state, Reese was sent in as a whip to ensure progress
resumed smoothly. In March, the campaign was having difficulties in organizing in Mercer and
Mingo Counties. As a result, Reese and McDonough were sent to the counties to organize.70 If a
politician had flipped and was now pro-Kennedy, Reese and/or McDonough were to gauge the
politician to determine if it was smart for the campaign to associate themselves with them on the
slate.71
Reese was recognized for his challenging work for Kennedy during the 1960 election and
became the deputy chair of the Democratic National Committee. He was also assigned to run the
voter registration division drive for Lyndon Johnson’s re-election in 1964.72 Using elements of
the O’Brien Manual, Reese spearheaded a movement that saw four million voters added to the
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registration lists, the largest drive of its kind at the time.73 The effort was made by telephone
which O’Brien had emphasized to Reese just four years before. The drive impacted the 1964
presidential election. The national voter turnout increased from the previous election to 61.9%.
President Johnson’s 61.1% popular vote was the highest of any candidate since the 1820 election
(which James Monroe ran unopposed).74 President Johnson won the election in an electoral
landslide with 486 electoral votes to Barry Goldwater’s 52 electoral votes.75
It was after Reese’s work with Kennedy and the DNC that he began to forge his own path
and became a leading voice in the evolution of modern political consulting. He founded Matt
Reese & Associates, which later became Reese Communications Companies (RCC).76 RCC was
one of the first political consulting firms in the nation.77 Like other consultants, Reese worked on
a commission basis. The more polls, pieces of mail, or television advertisements a consultant
provided, the more money they made from the campaign that hired them.78 Fellow consultant,
Jill Buckley, believed that “it became abundantly clear…that if you were selling a real product
like the media, you could charge significantly more for it…[and] you could get the respect of
campaigns because they thought you were selling something that they truly didn’t know how to
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do.”79 Consulting firms were able to work for cheap while making a profit. “We made a profit on
the letter. We made a profit on the phone calls. We made a profit on the computer work. We
made a profit on the polling,” said Reese.80 Reese was among the first to turn political consulting
into a business in the latter part of the twentieth century.
When hired, Reese honed in on targeting precincts most likely to turn the election in his
client’s favor.81 The kind of voters he had in mind were undecided voters and voters who favored
a candidate, but seldom went to the polls.82 The hyper precision was also notable as he began this
method in an era before computers were able to process the raw data to provide an indication of
where the campaign should go. The data was processed by hand. Using the data gathered, Reese
was able to put together instant coalitions, recruit hundreds of block captains, and utilize
telephone banks.83
When computers became accessible and affordable beginning in the 1970s, Reese was
the first in the political consulting business to use the technology. He secured an exclusivity deal
with the makers of software called the Claritas Cluster System. The software was developed by
statistician Johnathan Robbin in the early 1970s. Robbin created a system called PRIZM
(Potential Rating Index by ZIP Markets) by linking consumer information with the information
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from US ZIP codes, census tracts, and enumeration districts.84 Robbin did not have political
consulting in mind when creating the PRIZM and firms initially stayed away from the program
due to how expensive it was.85
Reese and pollster Bill Hamilton saw potential in the program. In 1978, they purchased
exclusive campaign rights to use the product.86 It combined surveys and market research to
provide even greater precision in targeting campaign communication and outreach efforts.87
Using Claritas, Hamilton could poll a sample group of voters in a state and tell Reese what kinds
of people think of a specific issue or candidate.88 With the data that Hamilton gathered, Reese
was able to create a campaign strategy to appeal to whomever he wanted to reach.89 The mass
mailings and telephone campaigns that Campaigns Inc., O’Brien and even Reese once oversaw
can now become more precise with its targeting. “Polls by themselves are valuable but
inadequate. For example, a poll may tell a campaign consultant that working-class Catholic
housewives aren’t favorably impressed with a candidate…now Claritas can specify block groups
most likely to contain working-class Catholic women,” explained Reese to The Washington Post.
The data clusters allowed Reese to deepen his work in a process known as geodemography and
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grow the field.90 These groupings allowed Reese to identify “leaning persuadables” and target
them specifically.91
With their exclusive access to Claritas, campaigns paid Reese and Hamilton to compute
raw data and to assist them in targeting the leaning persuadables. The data showed that people
who share similar demographic, housing, and socio-economic characteristics tend to live in
homogeneous neighborhoods and share similar lifestyles, thus they have similar potential for
products and react similarly to media, direct mail, and other promotions.92 This knowledge
allowed Reese to carefully craft a message that appealed to the residents of a specific
neighborhood to gain their vote.
Access to such data also makes it cheaper for the consultant. Rather than the approach in
the past that targeted its audience indiscriminately, the data clusters provided by Claritas allowed
for more precise mailings. It also took some emphasis from television ads since they could target
a household rather than a general area. In 1978, Reese was hired on behalf of organized labor to
defeat a statewide ballot initiative that would have turned Missouri into a “right-to-work” state.93
Polls suggested that a majority of Missouri voters would vote for the measure, but Reese targeted
almost 600,000 households that he believed would vote against the measure if persuaded to show
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up on Election Day.94 He spent less than 15 percent of his budget on television ads; instead, he
concentrated his resources to target persuadable voters through a combination of door-to-door
visits, phone calls, and specially tailored mailings.95 Reese reasoned television commercials
would inspire the opposition and attract opponents who normally would not vote, the opposite of
the intended result.96
The targeting paid off when the initiative lost despite polling finding it would have won.
Rese estimated that 110,000 new voters registered and an increase in turnout contributed to the
amendment losing with only 40% of the vote.97 Author of Building a Business of Politics: The
Rise of Political Consulting and the Transformation of American Democracy, Adam Sheingate,
correctly observed that the victory demonstrated the power and precision of sophisticated
targeting methods to identify voters open to the message of the campaign.98 The efficiency of
Reese’s use of the program convinced other consultants to use it as well. The Claritas system
was dubbed the “New Magic” and soon politicians began to use it themselves. Birch Bayh was
the first candidate to use the Claritas system while running for president in 1980.99
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Contemporary consultant and former associate of Reese, Walter D. Clinton, asserted that
“Matt Reese began the whole theory of targeting.”100 Reese identified “hardcore voters” and
“softcore voters.” Hardcore voters were individuals, who always went to the polls, even in lowturnout elections regardless of the candidates or issues. Targeting these voters was crucial in
low-visibility races such as primaries.101 Softcore voters, however, are voters who only go to the
polls in elections in which they are interested. These elections are highly visible races such as the
presidential elections.102 Before it became standard to compile the data centrally, voter data was
done county by county with different formats. Compiling this information before Claritas and
similar computer programs in the late 1970s and early 1980s was tedious or as Clinton put it “a
nightmare.”103
Claritas still works today though it is no longer exclusive for political consultants. The
efficiency demonstrated by Reese has allowed it to transcend politics. According to their website
Claritas argues that “all marketing is personal. So, the more marketers know about current
customers and potential prospects, the better.”104 Major companies of numerous backgrounds
such as Farmers Insurance, Goya, H&R Block, McDonald’s, Volkswagen, and Comcast all make
use of Claritas.105 The program has over 10,000 highly predictive demographic and behavioral
indicators and comprehensive multicultural data to help give marketers the most complete
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understanding of the American consumer.106 The process used for these private companies is still
similar as it was when it was used by Reese for politicians. The audience is identified and from
there they deliver multichannel execution to the intended audience. Afterwards, they measure
and optimize the performance and refine their strategies for the audience.107
The late 1970s and early 1980s was the height of Reese’s career. From 1980 to 1982, he
directed more than thirty campaigns. In 1982 alone, he oversaw fourteen campaigns. These
campaigns stretched from the American East Coast to Hawaii to South American nations such as
Venezuela.108 Campaigns and Elections Magazine contended that at one point, nearly every
Democratic political consultant in the business had worked for Reese.109
Joe Slade White, President Joe Biden’s long time media strategist and whose firm has
worked on four hundred campaigns, got his first job from Matthew Reese in 1973.110 He was
named the Democratic Strategist of the year by the American Association of Political
Consultants (AAPC) in 2014.111 Walter (Wally) Clinton, founder, and owner of the American
Directions Group (ADG) also got his start working for Reese. He worked for Reese for four
years and left to find the Clinton Group (now the ADG). The ADG has recruited more than two
million grassroots activists, made more than fourteen million survey calls, and has worked on
thousands of ballot initiatives and political campaigns in all fifty states, Canada, South and
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Central American and Europe.112 Nancy Todd, the first woman inducted into the AAPC Hall of
Fame, was first employed by Reese in 1979. She has worked on 196 campaigns in forty-two
states and six countries. She has a 98%-win rate and was instrumental in legalizing casinos in
Mississippi, Indiana, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and New York.113 Charles Manatt Jr. worked as the
Democratic national chair in the early 1980s. He also began his career at the grass-roots level
working for Reese.114 By the time that Reese retired from politics in the early 1980s, his pedigree
was massive, with some form of connection to nearly every Democratic consultant.
The early 1980s proved hectic for Reese. He traveled across America from the mainland
to the Hawaiian Islands and back to keep up with the campaigns on which he was working. “I
knew what we were supposed to be doing, but you can’t remember the details of fourteen
different campaigns,” Reese confessed during his retirement.115 So, he transitioned his services
to the private sector. He previously flirted with corporate work in the late 1970s. In 1976, he
managed a campaign in New York on behalf of the tobacco industry to build support for a cut in
the cigarette tax.116 In 1980, he and Bill Hamilton used Claritas in California to determine which
California voters would be in support of creating nonsmoking sections in public places.117 He
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also conducted a massive grassroots lobbying campaign on behalf of the Natural Gas Supply
Association that targeted potential supporters for a letter-writing campaign.118 He carried out
these practices when he worked for AT&T, Chevron, and United Airlines among many others.119
Reese Communications Companies became one of the first firms to begin to collaborate
exclusively with private companies and apply its philosophies in the private sector. These
companies were paying large sums to have access to the precise science that Reese had
harnessed by doing direct mail advertising and issues marketing.
The business side of politics grew further in the late 1980s when Reese decided to sell his
firm, Reese Communications Companies and its subsidiary, Targeting Systems, Inc. (TSI) to a
British marketing firm, Wire and Plastic Products, Limited (WPP) for $35 million with $14
million received up front and another $21 million for meeting five-year targets.120 Reese was
amazed by how much he received for Reese Communications. “I mean, I’d have sold it for half
that, gladly,” he joked a decade later.121 He was severely underestimating the increasing value of
firms. Before purchasing RCC, WPP bought out JWT Group Inc., parent of J. Walter Thompson
Co., then the world’s fourth-largest advertising agency, for $566 million.122 In the five years
before Reese’s sale of RCC and TSI, the combined revenue of the two sister companies grew
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from $4.5 million to $14.4 million. Their profits before taxes grew from $512,000 to $3.5
million.123
Reese Communications Companies and JWT Group Inc.’s acquisition was just the
beginning of conglomerates consuming political and advertising firms. WPP began as a British
wire basket manufacturer and now it is the world’s largest advertising and public relations
company. It generates $17 billion in annual revenues and operates more than 350 firms in fortynine countries.124 Twenty-six of these firms work in the United States and specialize in political
consulting, polling, and lobbying.125
Since the 2010s, WPP has attempted to make a spot for itself in the digital marketplace
through additional mergers and acquisitions. WPP acquired the digital advertising agency AKQA
for $540 million.126 The following year Burson-Marsteller, a firm that the company purchased in
2001 announced that they are partnering with the Republican firm Targeted Victory, the leading
provider of digital services to the Republican Party.127
WPP is not alone in the corporate takeover of consulting firms. The Interpublic Group of
Companies, Inc. (IPG), Publicis Groupe, and Omnicom Group together with WPP make up what
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The New York Times hailed as Advertising’s Big Four.128 These firms sometimes serve
companies larger than themselves. Their work ranges from private companies seeking
advertising consulting to political campaigns.129
Most of these corporate developments occurred after Matthew Reese retired and after he
passed away. However, that does not diminish the significance that his influence had to lead up
to the mega corporations blurring the lines between political consulting and advertising. The
bleed over between marketing and political consulting also grew in the 1980s, spearheaded by
Reese himself. His work with companies like AT&T was done through his firm, RCC, not by
himself personally or another subsidiary of RCC. Private companies became increasingly
interested in gathering, growing, and applying their market data to expand their reach. Using
geodemography and the concept of targeting leaning persuadables, if Reese were able to tell if a
working-class Catholic family on Baker Street would vote one way but the working-class
Protestant family on Able Street would vote another way, private companies could gather similar
data to determine how the Catholic family on Baker Street would react to an advertisement
compared to the Protestant family on Able Street.
Using the voter file data and commercial data to create a list of persuadable voters,
campaigns target their audience.130 If three households were watching the same show as it aired,
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Household A would receive a political commercial whereas Household B would have received a
different political commercial, but Household C might not see either commercial at all.131
By selling his firm, Reese was one of the first to sell off, a trend that accelerated in the
latter part of the 1980s. WPP’s and others growth point to a corporate consolidation of political
and marketing work in the United States.132 Despite the partisan nature that comes with the work
of political consulting, the firms make strides to avoid losing potential customers on either side
of the aisle. That is why these firms have subsidiaries that work with liberal candidates and
issues exclusively and conservative candidates and issues exclusively.
The efforts made by early consultants such as Reese transformed the professional
political consulting business into what it is now. The practices and technology that he introduced
to the field are commonly applied today by consultants. The tactics that Reese pioneered and
refined throughout his career are rooted in his involvement in the West Virginia primary.
Because of his work with the Kennedy campaign in West Virginia, they were able to reach out to
voters in unprecedented ways and influenced the election to favor Kennedy. Influenced by the
theories by Larry O’Brien during the primary, Reese refined them and launched his career
through the success he brought the Kennedy campaign. The 1960 West Virginia primary is not
just where Reese got his career’s start, but also the practices that are still used today were
introduced on a large scale, making Reese one of the most important political consultants in
history.
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CHAPTER TWO:
CAMELOT IN WEST VIRGINIA

Matthew Reese’s career as a professional political consultant began with his work on the
1960 West Virginia Democratic Primary. Reese used his political experience to assist Senator
John F. Kennedy to victory in West Virginia and eventual election to the presidency. Scholars
such as political scientist David Corbin recognize the importance that Kennedy’s victories had,
but Reese’s role in political consulting and grassroots activism is often overlooked.133 Reese was
able to mobilize a large volunteer base through grassroots efforts that helped organize Kennedy
campaign events, helped eliminate the concerns among voters concerning Kennedy’s
Catholicism, and secured the support of high-profile Democratic leaders that aided the Kennedy
campaign to victory.
Political historians have heralded the 1960 West Virginia primary as one of the most
important elections in modern history.134 History and political science professor Robert Rupp
described the impact the election had as a type of foreshadowing for how future political
campaigns were going to be run. Slating, the process in which the voter voted for candidates that
aligned themselves with one another during the campaign and making deals with political leaders
were still an important part of the election, though it was becoming less important and infrequent
in general for politics. Instead, the 1960 presidential election showed the increased importance of
spending vast amounts of money to appeal to voters. With the unprecedented amount of money
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that was poured into the election, and the use of the latest technology such as the television, the
campaign focused on creating an image of a candidate as the first popular-culture political
celebrity.135
Reese was working with the Kennedy campaign on a modern style of campaigning for
office. Primary elections were still new at the national level by the time of the 1960 West Virginia
primary. The Progressive Era held the first primary elections. The process allowed a state’s citizens
to cast the vote for the candidate that they want to represent their party in the general election. It
was one of the many progressive reforms during the era to eliminate the power that political bosses
and backroom politics had.136 The idea of primaries did not catch on nationally until after World
War II. Both World Wars and the Great Depression made it hard to continue to enact reforms.137
Several states adopted primary elections, but not every state followed suit. As a result of fewer
primaries, the importance of each election was heightened as close primary races made it more
likely for the nominee to be decided at that party’s national convention rather than commanding a
clear mandate that they could be the nominee.
Of the 1,523 delegates that would be at the 1960 Democratic convention in Los Angeles,
California that summer, only 584 came from slates associated with primary results. The party
bosses controlled the remaining delegates in the thirty-four remaining non-primary states.138
Because of this, Kennedy believed the only path he had to the nomination was through victories
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in the primaries so that the will of the voters could not be denied.139 Political analysts at the time
disagreed with the idea that a primary can help propel a candidate to election. An article published
in January 1960 in the Charleston Gazette headlined “Primary Won’t Elect a President.” The
reporter who authored the article, Harry Hoffman, concluded the piece by writing that “you don’t
get elected president by winning the West Virginia primary.”140
West Virginia had traditionally been a Democratic state going into the spring of 1960. At
the time of the election, the Democratic Party was in control of the state government and had been
since Franklin Roosevelt’s election in 1933. West Virginia Democrats maintained a two-to-one
edge in registration and had majorities in both houses of the state legislature. Because the politics
of the state so heavily favored the Democrats, the most important election was the one in May, not
the one in November since most of the work was “over the day after the primary.”141 Consequently,
this put more attention on the primary between Kennedy and Humphrey for West Virginia voters.
Theodore White, author of The Making of a President 1960, speculated that had Humphrey
withdrawn from West Virginia when he lost in Wisconsin then it would have made West Virginia’s
primary less important. Because Humphrey failed to carry Wisconsin it would have been best for
him to withdraw from West Virginia to let the election become meaningless and give Eastern party
bosses a chance to choose the nominee.142
Despite Humphrey’s loss in the Wisconsin primary, the Kennedy campaign did not feel
that the West Virginia primary was one to look over. The Humphrey campaign continued to believe
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that West Virginia was viable due to the state’s strong union membership, vast unemployment,
and an overwhelming number of Protestant voters.143 After Humphrey entered the contest, the
Kennedy camp sent campaign leadership, Robert Kennedy, Larry O’Brien, and Kenny O’Donnell
to Charleston to meet Bob McDonough, the director of John Kennedy’s campaign in West
Virginia. Kennedy and McDonough met with Matthew Reese and workers at the Kanawha Hotel
and asked why the state voter’s reception to the Kennedy camp was cold. One worker replied
“there’s only one problem. He’s a Catholic.”144 Historian Dan Fleming concluded this reception
shocked the Kennedy campaign, and it forced the campaign to think seriously if they should pursue
an effort in West Virginia.145
The importance of Reese’s political consulting became increasingly evident during the
election as the Kennedy campaign began addressing the conservative-leaning West Virginia
electorate and their concerns regarding Kennedy’s Catholicism. During the Charleston meeting,
Reese urged the leadership that the sooner they could get Kennedy in West Virginia, the better for
the campaign. It was important because the longer they waited, the harder it would be to overcome
the Catholic issue. Thomas Oliphant and Curtis Wilkie in their book The Road to Camelot: Inside
JFK’s Five-Year Campaign recognized how difficult the Catholic issue would be for the campaign
if they could not get out ahead of it. The state was almost ninety-five percent non-Catholic, and
some areas of the state was vehemently anti-Catholic.146 The co-chair of the John F. Kennedy for
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President in Cabell County, Andrew Houvouras, recalled that rural towns in West Virginia that
had no Catholic churches spread anti-Catholicism literature.147
The Kennedy leadership hired Reese to be the Executive Director of Citizens for Kennedy
in West Virginians. Reese was responsible for organizing the grassroots campaigning throughout
most of the state. He oversaw the construction of Kennedy for President clubs or organizations in
forty-five of the state’s fifty-five counties.148 Because Reese led the grassroots efforts through most
of the state, McDonough dubbed Reese’s job as the “people desk” since he kept track of everybody
over the state, where they were and what they were doing.149 “He played a responsible and vital
part in the part,” McDonough remarked about Reese in 1964.150 McDonough was impressed by
how effective Reese’s leadership was in these counties. “Matt started tightening up the counties I
hadn’t been able to pay much attention to and going into some counties that I had not been able to
get into.”151 Furthermore, Reese also functioned as the state campaign’s liaison for out-of-state
leadership such as Robert Kennedy, Ted Kennedy, Larry O’Brien, and Ken O’Donnell.152
Whereas Reese organized the Kennedy campaign’s structure, Humphrey’s campaign
structure was nonexistent. Unlike the Reese-led Kennedy campaign, Humphrey’s team made no
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effort to establish a presence in many West Virginia counties. Instead, the Humphrey campaign
divided the state into two parts, a northern part, and a southern part, and recruited only two state
cochairs.153 The campaign also lacked the same grassroots support that Reese employed in
Kennedy’s campaign. William L. Jacobs, one of the Humphrey’s campaign co-chairs, recalled that
his only asset was a telephone card with the names and numbers of known friends, Democratic
leaders and lawyers that were partial to Humphrey.154
Reese’s preferred method of reaching potential voters in West Virginia resembled the
strategy that Campaigns Inc. previously utilized in California, including flooding the state with
mailings and ads while strengthening the grassroots support network. This philosophy is rooted in
the Larry O’Brien Manual. In the first part of the Manual, it demonstrated how to form a
committee to tap into grassroots support. O’Brien argued that grassroots efforts were the most
effective method of campaigning since it was ordinary people appealing to ordinary people and
provided an edge for a campaign if they participated in it.155 Reese also assembled the Kennedy
chairpersons using the same strategies that were described in the Manual. Political scientist Dennis
Johnson argued that through this organization came a potent volunteer base.156
An example of the grassroots outreach that Reese conducted was having his volunteers
craft and send out personalized messages to West Virginian voters. The twenty-four women that
worked for him in Charleston were asked to bring a list of all their club memberships, PTAs, and
Christmas card recipients. Using the names from these lists, the campaign contacted as many West
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Virginia voters as possible and sent out panel cards of invitations that said, “West Virginians for
Kennedy cordially invites you to meet the Senator and Mrs. Kennedy.”157 The invitation was sent
out in a formal manner, appealing to those who wanted to be involved in something special. Reese
and his workers maintained a file system to prevent duplication of voters on the lists. The crosschecking and filing system introduced was new at the time and Reese used it for the remainder of
his career. Reese and his volunteer campaign workers did not exclude registered Republicans in
their mass mailings. Reese believed that if they won the primary then they would be trying to
appeal to these voters in the general election. Additionally, the cost of these invitations were only
nineteen cents per person, so sending the invitations to register Republican voters was not cost
prohibitive.158 The inexpensive cost of the letters allowed Reese to host events like this throughout
the state at little cost to the campaign.
Another example of the popularity of the campaign’s outreach involved an event in
Huntington, West Virginia. The campaign sent out 15,000 cards for people to attend the event and
meet the Kennedys. The campaign sent thousands of invitations. Reese expected only several
hundred people to show up to the event. Conversely, Reese and his staff were shocked when 5,000
people arrived. People kept arriving which forced the fire marshal to close the venue and refuse to
let additional people into the event.159
Reese’s grassroot workers also prepared and provided campaign material, staffers, and
money to other candidates that they felt were competitive within their county to show that Kennedy
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supported statewide Democrats. This method called the “kitty” was one that Reese said that every
candidate was expected to partake in. If a campaign was successful with contributing to the “kitty”
then it contributed to the success in statewide and down ballot races. Each candidate was expected
to put money into the “kitty” to hire workers and cars. The “kitty” assisted in the gubernatorial
race and local elections all the way down to Justice of the Peace. If the campaign associated with
a popular down ballot candidate, it would reflect in the polls as voters would vote for them also
since they paid into that candidate’s “kitty.”
The Kennedy campaign did not offer gubernatorial candidates access to the “kitty”
though. Candidate and eventual governor William Barron refused to openly take a side. He
remained “aloof” according to Robert McDonough.160 However, as the election drew closer
Barron’s campaign attempted to establish a relationship with Kennedy’s. Barron’s campaign
reached out and proclaimed that if Kennedy supported him in certain counties, then he would
support Kennedy in other counties. This attempt to work with the “kitty” was shut down
immediately though. McDonough turned down the proposition because they believed that
Kennedy had more to offer than Barron.161 Consequently, the Kennedy campaign did not have
the help of the Barron campaign nor did the Barron campaign have help from Kennedy’s.
This type of down ballot slating has been observed by scholars. In his work JFK Rising:
The 1960 West Virginia Primary and the Emergence of John F. Kennedy, historian Richard
Robbins revealed that the Kennedy campaign attempted to attach themselves to a county’s
faction with the “most muscle.”162 If they were not successful with the strongest faction, they
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tried to work with the next strongest faction down the ballot. Once they became tied to a faction,
they sent scores of their volunteers and money to make that faction the county’s strongest.163
Robert Rupp, West Virginia Wesleyan College political science professor, also
acknowledged the Kennedy campaign’s use of slating. He points out that the process was not
new to American elections but remained an important part of West Virginia’s electoral
process.164 In West Virginia’s capital Charleston, a voter had the selection of fifty-three
individual candidates. When the Charleston Gazette reproduced sample ballots in Kanawha
County, it required three newspaper pages.165 Rupp states plainly that a slate of preferred
candidates was practical to the average voter as it expedited what could have been a prolonged
process.166 Reese attaching the Kennedy campaign to the most successful slates contributed to
the campaign’s victory. Voters expected a quick and straightforward process to vote, and the
slate of preferred candidates allowed them to be in and out of the voting booth in reasonable
time.
Kennedy’s Catholic religious beliefs were a major issue for the campaign entering the West
Virginia primary. Before the Wisconsin primary was over, Kennedy’s campaign was in West
Virginia to speak with religious leaders to try and erase their fears. In March 1960, Charles G.
Peters Jr., the head of Kennedy’s campaign in Kanawha County, hosted a confidential luncheon
with a dozen prominent Protestant ministers and two rabbis, but the luncheon did not garner the
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attendance that they anticipated.167 The polls that the Kennedy Camp conducted throughout 1958
and 1959 showed Kennedy winning with a 70-to-30 margin also began to disappear. Just three
weeks before the primary, Kanawha County polled sixty percent of potential voters for Humphrey
and forty percent for Kennedy.168 Kennedy was frustrated with the dwindling lead. His advisors
explained that “no one in West Virginia knew you were a Catholic in December. Now they
know.”169 Despite the change in poll numbers and worries over his beliefs, Reese did not fear that
Kennedy’s Catholicism was an issue. If anything, he believed that it energized West Virginia
Democrats and West Virginia Catholics alike.
I think that the fact that the President was a Catholic and the fact that that was such an issue
brought a lot of very talented, very able volunteers to the political arena. A friend of mine
in Huntington told me that he was not working so hard for Kennedy because Kennedy was
Catholic. He said, ‘I'm working hard for Kennedy because I'm a Catholic.’ It was important
to him.” The fact this man was a Catholic was of very little importance. If he had only been
a Catholic, he would have been defeated, but he was much more than a Catholic.
Consequently, this was not an important element in the election. Actually, it may have
helped us in some areas.170

The primary concern for Bob Myers, one of the three co-chairmen of John F. Kennedy for
President in Cabell County, was not whether Kennedy was elected or not, but that West Virginia
would not be slandered in the media as religiously intolerant.171 He even credited the support of
Catholics as a major reason Kennedy won Cabell County and even the whole state.
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Most of the money was raised from Catholics. There is no question about it, our Catholic
population here contributed substantially to the total Kennedy effort. In fact, without the
Catholic assistance and volunteers and financial arrangements, we probably wouldn’t have
much of a Kennedy campaign in Cabell County.172
Myers added that eighty to ninety percent of the active volunteer effort was by members
of the Catholic faith.173
Another one of the co-chairmen for Kennedy in Cabell County, Andrew Houvouras also
sensed that the Catholic issue was not as major of a concern as initially feared.174 Houvouras
believed that the campaign won because they organized a large volunteer base early. The makeup
of the volunteers were people from across the state and various backgrounds. Drawing again from
the lessons of the O’Brien Manual, the Kennedy campaign stressed the importance of a
geographical balance between the volunteers.175 This balance ensured that the committee and its
workers did not favor one area of the state more than another.
Historian Dan Fleming is dismissive of the impact that the religious issue had on the
campaign. He cites evidence such as Kennedy winning mock elections at public schools and polls
held at factories that showed Kennedy winning in run-away fashion.176 He also uses the large
crowds that turned out at Franklin Roosevelt Jr.’s appearances as a reason that it is clear in
retrospect that Kennedy having any sort of trouble in West Virginia was overblown.177 What
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Fleming overlooks in that analysis is the work that done to counter the anti-Catholic feelings due
to declining poll numbers. Additionally, he overlooks that the popularity of the Roosevelt name in
West Virginia that would have driven crowds out regardless of the reason and the cold reception
to Kennedy from union and blue-collar workers.178
The campaign countered the anti-Catholicism sentiments that arose during the primary.
Opponents of Kennedy placed copies of a fake oath that the Knights of Columbus allegedly swore
to in West Virginia resident’s mailboxes. Other anti-Kennedy literature warned that if a Catholic
were elected president that the Catholics would attack Protestant pregnant women, split open their
stomachs and bash the fetus’s head with stones.179 If the campaign could identify a religious leader
or church who had circulated the literature, the campaign dispatched a staffer to show them the
fallacy in their belief. In some cases, the leaders apologized for spreading misinformation and in
other cases the campaign threatened prosecution if they did not cease their slander.180
Kennedy himself tackled the religious matter on his first day of campaigning in West
Virginia. After spending the day walking around the streets of Charleston speaking with the locals,
Kennedy stopped to address a crowd of three to four hundred people.181 The audience was
composed of young college students from Morris Harvey College (now the University of
Charleston). One of the audience members asked Kennedy about his religion and Kennedy
responded
I am a Catholic, but the fact that I was born a Catholic, does that mean I can’t be president
of the United States? I’m able to serve in Congress, and my brother was able to give his
178
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life, but we can’t be president. There is nothing in my religious faith that prevents me from
fulfilling my oath of office. If I thought there was, I shouldn’t have been a senator. I
shouldn’t have been a congressman and, to be frank, I shouldn’t have been taken into the
service of the United States during World War Two.182
Robert McDonough remembered that Kennedy’s response won the crowd over. It was not
a response that they were expecting or prepared for, but it was an answer that was respected.183
The response from the crowd was not overwhelming, but it shifted towards a warmer reception
regarding his faith.184
Despite the public’s reaction to Kennedy’s religion appearing to be less of an issue, the
Kennedy camp remained concerned it was the central issue. In March, McDonough and Reese
flew representatives of the state’s sectors that they devised to Washington D.C. The purpose of
this meeting was so that campaign leaders could meet with members of the Kennedy team to
determine if the religious issue had made Kennedy’s victory impossible. McDonough, Reese, and
Kennedy’s staff all met with Robert Kennedy, the Senator’s brother, and leading campaign aide,
and reviewed a map of West Virginia to evaluate Kennedy’s election prospects across the state.
Bob Myers, co-chair of John F. Kennedy for President in Cabell County, informed Robert Kennedy
that he did not think that John Kennedy’s Catholicism was a “tremendous factor, although it
certainly would be a factor.”185 Robert Kennedy remained unconvinced and asked the group for
ideas on how his brother could overcome the public’s misconceptions of his religious beliefs. A
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national Gallup poll from 1959 showed that twenty percent of polled voters would not support a
Catholic for president even if the person were “generally well qualified.”186
Myers suggested that the campaign could attach itself to an already popular political name
in West Virginia, the Roosevelts.187 Again, Kennedy was unconvinced until Matt Reese spoke up
and recounted a conversation that he had with a friend on the streets of the southern West Virginia
town of Logan just before he flew to D.C. He remembered that his friend bragged that Eleanor
Roosevelt once stood in the very spot where they were standing. Reese assumed he meant just
recently until he realized his friend was talking about when Eleanor visited the town in 1934. Once
Reese explained the god-like worship of the Roosevelts in West Virginia and the legacy they still
carry there, Kennedy was interested. Because of New Deal policies, the Roosevelts were highly
revered. After the meeting concluded, Robert Kennedy called up the son of the former president,
Franklin Roosevelt Jr., to ask if he would help Kennedy in West Virginia.188
Myers and Reese’s suggestion to bring the Roosevelts into the campaign was a pivotal
moment for the Kennedy campaign. In Williamson, West Virginia, the son of the famed president
stood in front of a window of a floral shop that hung a photo of President Roosevelt and a sign that
read “Franklin D. Jr. will be here today.” There in the coal fields, Roosevelt Jr. proclaimed that he
wanted the crowd to know that he is a Protestant, and he is campaigning for Kennedy.189 He also
further highlighted Kennedy’s military service during World War II. In Greenbrier County,
Roosevelt accused Humphrey of asking the draft board for several military deferments during
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World War II. “These are the facts, and I resent any man who claimed he was 4F all the way
through the war when he really stayed out of his own request until just before the end of the war,”
Roosevelt told television reporters.190 Kennedy publicly disapproved of Roosevelt Jr.’s comments,
but the campaign got the information about Humphrey “from an anonymous source in Minnesota,”
and the campaign “decided that the material should be made public by FDR Jr.”191
Roosevelt Jr.’s involvement in the campaign also provided Kennedy a chance to garner
more support from the Democratic elite. Kennedy was not popular among the Democratic elite.
Former president Harry Truman believed that Kennedy was too young to be president. Roosevelt
Jr.’s mother, Eleanor Roosevelt, sided with Truman.192 Adlai Stevenson, the de facto leader of the
Democratic Party having been the party’s nominee for president in 1952 and 1956, remained silent
on the matter. However, in private Stevenson was also concerned that Kennedy’s age was a
problem.193

West Virginia’s longtime senator, Robert Byrd, asked his people to vote for

Humphrey. “If you are for Adlai E. Stevenson, Senator Stuart Symington, Senator Johnson, or
John Doe, [this primary] may be your last chance [to stop Kennedy.]194 Despite his plea to vote
for Humphrey, Byrd was not a Humphrey supporter. He backed his friend and ally, Senator Lyndon
Johnson, to be the party’s nominee and if he could help secure a Humphrey victory in West
Virginia then it would likely create a contested convention where he could help Johnson secure
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the nomination.195 When Kennedy first registered to enter the West Virginia presidential primary,
Byrd distributed a questionable poll in terms of methodology that showed Lyndon Johnson as the
state’s top choice and Kennedy was the last choice among Democratic local leaders.196
Theodore White observed that the introduction of Roosevelt to the campaign shifted the
state’s sentiment on not just Kennedy’s Catholicism, but Kennedy’s personality and history. Polls
out of Charleston, West Virginia showed that Humphrey led sixty-four percent to Kennedy’s
thirty-six percent, but two weeks before the election the lead slipped to fifty-five percent over
forty-five percent. On the weekend before the election Kennedy gained the lead forty-five percent
to forty-two percent.197 Reese tapping Roosevelt Jr. into the campaign paid off as Kennedy
mounted a growth in polling numbers. Even the dismissive historian Irwin Gellman wrote that
Roosevelt’s endorsement of Kennedy was almost like “God’s son coming down and saying it was
all right to vote for this Catholic, that it was permissible, and it was not something terrible to do.”198
Richard Robbins called Roosevelt’s campaigning for Kennedy “masterful” and that a lot of West
Virginians signed on to the campaign because of the Roosevelt attraction.199
Another major hurdle the Kennedy campaign had to overcome was the lack of support they
received from unions. This startled Reese at first, telling William Young, an oral historian for the
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Kennedy Library, that it disturbed the campaign a great deal.200 The politically-influential former
President of the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), John L. Lewis, favored Stuart
Symington, a senator from Missouri.201 Lewis was upset at Kennedy for his role in passing the
1959 Landrum-Griffin Labor-reform bill that regulated labor unions’ internal affairs and their
relationship with employers.202 The president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT
or better known as The Teamsters) James “Jimmy” Hoffa, disliked the Kennedys saying, “We
don’t support spoiled millionaires.”203 Joining the Teamsters, the forty-thousand-member UMWA
also supported the stop Kennedy movement. John L. Lewis “passed the word” to mine leaders
throughout West Virginia that he would like to see Kennedy defeated.204 Humphrey hoped to rely
on union leadership and union voters to carry him in West Virginia.205 His natural constituency
consisted of the voting bloc of blue-collar workers and union members.206
The UMWA represented a key voter block for the Kennedy campaign. It was the largest
union in West Virginia and was confronting a crisis as the coal industry witnessed the nation’s
consumption of coal dropping to twenty percent of its energy supply.207 West Virginia coal mining
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jobs also dropped by thirty-five percent from 1946 to 1960 with a peak number of jobs being
116,421 in 1947 to only 42,900 jobs in 1960.208 President Franklin Roosevelt allowed UMWA
President John L. Lewis to organize his miners and at their peak the UMWA wielded considerable
political influence.209
The IBT endorsed Humphrey and became the first industrial labor union to endorse either
candidate.210 Reese accused the president of the Charleston local of the IBT of sharing antiKennedy rhetoric and taking orders directly from Hoffa to endorse Humphrey. Eugene Carter
denied the accusation and informed Reese that it was only natural for the West Virginia
Teamsters to make such an endorsement after Kennedy’s repeated attacks on their leader. 211 He
tried to turn the IBT endorsement into a liability rather than an asset for Humphrey.
If Senator Humphrey is as outraged about the support of Mr. Hoffa and his racketeer
associates as he portrays himself to be, it is high time he repudiated Mr. Hoffa and told
him he wanted no help of any kind from him. The intervention of Mr. Hoffa in West
Virginia is just added evidence of the character of the gang-up against Senator Kennedy
in West Virginia, which has brought together the strangest array of political bedfellows in
the history of American politics.212
Not all the state’s union leadership stood against Kennedy. A flier from West Virginians
for Kennedy in 1960 revealed that AFL-CIO's president, George Meany endorsed the Senator. “I
wish on behalf of the AFL-CIO, to express again our appreciation for your leadership in the fight
to enact a law which will help honest labor and honest management deal with the problems
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created by a corrupt minority without interfering with the wholesome activities of the
overwhelming majority.”213 The flier also contained ringing endorsements from other labor
leaders such as Walter Reuther, president of the United Auto Workers, David J. McDonald,
president of the United Steelworkers’ Union and David Dubinsky, president of the International
Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union.214 Not only did the flier contain endorsements, it also detailed
Kennedy’s battles in Congress for the working-class that won over these union endorsements. He
fought the Taft-Hartley Act, supported minimum wage increases, sponsored legislation to
distribute surplus food to citizens in need, and provide federal aid to schools.215 The flier also
detailed Kennedy’s ten-point plan that he debuted in Wayne, West Virginia, an effort he planned
to undertake to bring federal government assistance to West Virginia. The flier also details the
efforts to strengthen the growth of the railroad industry.216
The campaign’s ongoing efforts to attract and maintain grassroots support were apparent
during an event in Huntington, West Virginia. Reese traveled with Kennedy to Huntington to
appeal to the union workers at H.K. Porter, a steel mill. Just across the street from H.K. Porter
was Marshall College (now University) which prohibited Kennedy from visiting the campus. A
phone call was made to Marshall student, known Kennedy supporter Bobby Nelson, to see if he
could round up students to wait at the edge of Marshall’s campus because a “backward rule
prohibiting candidates from visiting campus would make it impossible for him to set foot within
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the gates of Marshall.”217 Nelson gathered dozens of students who waited on Third Avenue to get
a glimpse of the Senator. As Kennedy was leaving H.K. Porter, he noticed the crowd of students
and made his way to them. Eventually five hundred students ran into the streets, blocking traffic,
to listen to Kennedy. There were no announcements or plans made ahead of time. Students found
out about the possible Kennedy sighting through word of mouth. Kennedy hopped on the roof of
a parked car and with no microphone or megaphone he spoke to the young adults and took their
questions.218
Huntington’s local news station, WSAZ, interviewed Ken Hechler, then a freshman
Representative for West Virginia’s 4th district, and he recalled even more students showing up.219
Hechler, who also once served as a political science professor at Marshall College, blamed
Marshall’s president Stewart Smith for not letting Kennedy on campus. As the crowd of students
grew, Hechler urged Kennedy to speak about the College’s efforts to become a university.220
Kennedy obliged and spoke about it to the energized crowd. The endorsement of Marshall
becoming a university and incorporating a graduate program would upgrade the college and
make it semantically equal to the state’s flagship institution, West Virginia University.221
Reese’s engineering of the grassroots efforts and work to secure the blue-collar union
bloc was central to Kennedy’s victory in West Virginia. However, sometimes Reese had to
switch from the political organizer to surrogate for the candidate. If Kennedy was not feeling
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well, Reese stumped to fill in for the Senator. One incident occurred after Kennedy contracted
laryngitis the day before a series of campaign appearances. He contacted Reese at midnight to
meet him in Charleston that morning. Reese agreed, expecting to only deliver one prepared
speech, not realizing he agreed to deliver stump speeches throughout the state. While traveling to
Boone County, Kennedy wrote on a notepad some points to make, but Reese was unable to read
his handwriting. They arrived at each location and Kennedy was introduced but then Reese
stepped up and said “No, I’m not John Kennedy, but I’m here to talk for him because his voice is
hurting.”222 He touted Kennedy’s service in the Pacific during World War II and highlighted the
fact that he was the only veteran running for president.223
While the political jab was more veiled than Roosevelt Jr’s attack on Humphrey’s
service, it worked. Rowland Evans, a close friend of Kennedy’s, said that Humphrey’s lack of a
war record “undoubtedly hurt” him politically in West Virginia.224 West Virginia had the highest
rate of enlistment among all the states during World War II. To make Humphrey appear as a
draft dodger or that he was eligible for 4F classification, meaning that he was unfit for service,
was damning. He was running against a World War II hero that saved the lives of his men.225
Even though the polls in West Virginia were narrowing, the election turned out to be an
exceptionally good day for Kennedy. Kennedy won West Virginia with 61% of the vote totaling
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236,510 votes to Humphrey’s 152,187.226 That same day he also won the Nebraska primary with
89% of the vote. There, Kennedy scored 80,408 votes to Humphry’s 3,202.227 Dan Fleming
attributed Kennedy’s victory to several factors. The attraction of Franklin Roosevelt Jr. energized
a once concerned population. The campaign slated better than Humphrey’s campaign and
attached itself to more winning slates. Finally, the campaign generated a large and enthusiastic
volunteer organization.228 As the Executive Director of Citizens for Kennedy in West Virginia,
Mathew Reese played a critical role in all of these deciding electoral factors.
Because Kennedy had several decisive primary victories in a row, the chances that the
Democratic National Convention would be a contested convention lessened. That July in
California, Kennedy won the nomination for president on the first ballot at the Democratic
National Convention with 806 votes. Lyndon Johnson finished in second with 409 votes and
joined Kennedy on his ticket running as his Vice President.229
John Kennedy kept Reese on the payroll after his nomination and Reese went to work for
the campaign throughout the convention and later the general election. At the Democratic
National Convention, Reese was summoned to work with the Tennessee delegation that was
present. After the convention, Robert Kennedy sent Reese to North Carolina to work in the
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leadup to the general election.230 In North Carolina, Reese served as the state coordinator for the
campaign and supervised the planning of Kennedy appearances in the state.231 Like in West
Virginia, Reese used the O’Brien Manual to build a large and solid grassroots bloc to appeal to
North Carolina voters.232
Reese’s work in West Virginia and North Carolina paid off for the Kennedy campaign
when both states went to Senator Kennedy in the general election. That November, despite
polling remarkably close with Vice President Richard Nixon in the popular vote, Kennedy
decisively won with 303 electoral college votes to Nixon’s 219.233 All eight of West Virginia’s
electoral votes went to Kennedy as he won the state with almost fifty-three percent of the vote.234
Kennedy also won North Carolina’s fourteen electoral votes with fifty-two percent of the vote.235
John Kennedy was elected as the nation’s thirty-fifth president, the first Catholic to do so.
Matthew Reese had been alongside him, coordinating two successful campaigns that contributed
to Kennedy’s victory.
Reese was rewarded for his work throughout 1960. He started the year as a volunteer for
the Kennedy campaign in 1960 and became one of the campaign’s top and most trusted
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consultants. He then became the deputy chair of the Democratic National Committee in January
1961 where he focused on voter registration. “When I went to the DNC, I was honored when
they asked me to handle voter registration, because I knew how important it was to the President.
The President almost had a fetish about voter registration. He felt it was the way to win elections,
and he directed the Chairman to emphasize always voter registration,” explained Reese.236 After
working in the DNC for several years, in 1966, Reese left and formed a political consulting firm
called Matt Reese & Associates which was later renamed Reese Communications Companies.
Political scientist Dennis Johnson acknowledged that Reese became a supreme field organizer
and a specialist in voter contact.237
As the Executive Director of Citizens for Kennedy in West Virginians for Kennedy,
Matthew Reese put together an astonishing grassroots effort for the Kennedy campaign. Through
his efforts he helped ease West Virginian voters’ concerns and fears of the possibility of having a
Catholic president. He aided the campaign in winning over labor unions and their workers. He
got the endorsements of popular Democrats like Franklin Roosevelt Jr. whose words carried
weight in West Virginia because of his father’s popular New Deal policies. Reese’s consulting
contributed to Kennedy’s victory.
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CHAPTER THREE:
THE NEW FRONTIER

The influence of Matthew Reese and his career in political consulting continues to be felt
in the twenty-first century. Reese’s adoption of computers and data-collection software such as
PRIZM and Claritas led to the increased usage of such tools and programs in the discipline.
Reese was among the first political consultants to take the tactics and strategies of elections into
the corporate advertising world. Through his mentorship, Reese inspired and trained future
generations of political and corporate consultants alike. Additionally, Reese’s inclusion of
women in his political consulting efforts helped open the once male-dominated field up to
women. As political scientist Larry Sabato argued, the rise of political consultants brought new
ways of winning elections. Consultants belonging to Reese’s pedigree have also furthered the
growth of the field by mirroring Reese and adopting even newer practices. As the technology has
advanced, these consultants continue to use geodemography with stronger software programs
compared to what Reese used in the late 1970s and 1980s.238
One such example of a political consultant inspired by Reese is Richard S. (Dick) Morris.
In the late 1970s, Morris, like Reese, was using polling data to help candidates shape their
messages. He was contacted by Arkansas attorney general Bill Clinton’s chief of staff, Steve
Smith, who asked him to help them determine if Clinton should run for US Senate or the
Arkansas governorship. With the data that he pulled Morris concluded that Clinton could beat
rivals in the gubernatorial race but would have little chance in the heavily crowded Senate
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race.239 The advice prevailed as Clinton was elected governor of Arkansas. Rewarded for his
work, Morris worked for the Clintons on and off again up to and including Clinton’s time in the
White House.240
One of Reese’s former associates that became an influential consultant is Walter “Wally”
Clinton. Clinton began his work in politics for Reese during Robert Kennedy’s 1968 presidential
campaign. For four years, Clinton worked the telephones for Reese, a common theme throughout
Reese’s career. Clinton took the telephone work he was doing and founded a political
telemarketing firm called the Clinton Group, now known as the American Directions Group
(ADG).241 The firm, much like Reese’s, assorted itself with grassroots advocacy and targeting,
the mobilization of volunteers, market research, and campaign communications. It has recruited
and mobilized more than two million grassroots activists, made fourteen million survey calls,
and worked on thousands of ballot initiatives and political campaigns in all fifty states, Canada,
South and Central America, and Europe. Also, like Reese’s firm, ADG has worked in both the
nonpolitical realm and the business realm.242 The significance of the multimedia, across the
spectrum consulting firm shows that the crossover of politics and business grew alongside and
after Reese.
The then Clinton Group turned volunteer political calling into a business. Clinton set up
call centers specifically for political campaigns. He first made use of this in 1972 when George
McGovern ran for president. Like Reese’s volunteers, Clinton trained the paid workers to make
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the calls and developed a list of people to call.243 He also was one of the first to begin using
robocalls. The development of the robocall sped up the process in which a campaign could
contact their audience. When robocalls were first used in McGovern’s campaign they were able
to call twenty people an hour. By the late 1990s, thanks to professional phone banks and
computerization, Clinton was reaching sixty to seventy people an hour.244
Clinton’s professionalization of the grassroots phone banks has become a standard for the
industry, an outgrowth of Reese’s emphasis on making connections with voters, but also a
departure from it. Clinton still embraces Reese’s belief that telephone contact is the most
effective method of contacting voters. “When we are on the telephone, people talk back to us.
That is the real value of the telephone,” Clinton argued.245 However, by championing the
recorded call, Clinton has moved away from such communications. A robocall is often one
ended and pressing buttons on the phone to generate a response lacks the real human experience
of talking to one another even if it is effective in gathering meaningful data. Political scientists
Alan S. Gerber and Donald P. Green argue that the value of these person-to-person conversations
is still there. Data from the 2000 presidential election found that non-partisan phone banks
increased voter turnout among the young people they targeted.246 However, in Gerber’s and
Green’s 2005 study on the relationship between phone calls and increased voter turnout, they
found that robocalls are ineffective.247 They discovered that in a 1998 general election in West
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Haven, Connecticut, which involved more than 17,000 registered voters that the robocalls “did
not seem to affect voter turnout.” Further tests in Iowa and Michigan also indicated “minimal
positive effect.”248 Regarding the effectiveness of robocall, Gerber and Green concluded that
they have minimal effect on voter turnout, instead they allow you to contact the maximum
number of people.249
The most effective way to still get people out to vote, regardless of the new inventions
that allow you to reach a greater number of people, is to make personal connections. This very
tactic is what Reese borrowed from Larry O’Brien’s campaign manual. Gerber and Green
concluded that people respond warmly when speaking to an actual human, rather than speaking
to an automated message. In fact, Gerber and Green cite the 1960 West Virginia Democratic
primary as an example of effective political consulting and campaigning.250 Reese’s grassroots
operations made personalized telephone calls to West Virginia residents asking for their support
or inviting them to a Kennedy campaign event. This led to large turnout at events such as the
event in Huntington, West Virginia that had to be closed by the fire marshal due to the
overwhelming number of people that arrived. Reese continued to use the personalization of his
messages for political campaigns and advertising campaigns. This personalization of messaging
provided for the growth of the practice of geodemography.
Geodemography or the targeting of precincts, neighborhoods, or individual blocks with a
specific message for the first time linked together the demographics of a region and its
geography. This connection between place and demographics birthed organizational techniques
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such as cluster targeting, which allowed Reese and others like him to be precise in their
messaging. Prior to the utilization of software that was able to compute such data, Reese and his
team analyzed precinct-by-precinct behavior in a jurisdiction, identified the precinct’s
performance, and then punched the data into hand-held calculators to statistically analyze the
information that they gathered.251 The Clinton Group founder, Walter Clinton, believed that
“Matt Reese began the whole theory of targeting.”252
Geodemography has been around informally since the nineteenth century. Chain stores
used the technique to evaluate potential new building sites based on the size and social
composition of the population around them. While being an innovative use of regional and local
data collection, the owners of these chain stores did not use the sophisticated calculation
techniques like Reese and his team deployed throughout the 1960s and certainly did not use
computers. The actual science of geodemography did not take shape until the early 1970s when
Jonathan Robbin, the founder of Claritas, created a software that could compute such data.253
The science and software used to analyze geodemographic data first appeared with the
development of the Claritas Cluster System by Robbin. The system only became possible with
the advent of the US ZIP code system. The postal codes had only been in use for a decade when
Robbin began using ZIP codes to identify trends within that code’s area. He developed the
algorithm that he later used in the Claritas system to create the ZIP Quality (ZQ) index. With the
ZQ index, Robbin identified forty lifestyle clusters, from most affluent (ZQ1 – Blue Blood
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Estates) to least affluent (ZQ40 – Public Assistance). With the data from the clusters gathered,
Claritas developed the PRIZM (Potential Rating Index by ZIP Markets) system that linked these
forty lifestyle clusters to consumer information such as magazine and newspaper subscriptions,
buying habits, television and radio ratings, automobile registration and others.254 The
development of the PRIZM system and ZQ index was significant as it was the first data cluster
of its kind to be done by software.
Mathew Reese was the first political consultant to make formal use of geodemography
software. In 1978, the state of Missouri went to the polls to vote on an initiative to make the state
a “right-to-work” state. Just three months before the election, the United Labor Committee of
Missouri, an organization that opposed the right-to-work measure and protected organized labor
and union interests in the state, hired Reese. The organization had received surveys from pollster
William Hamilton that indicated labor would lose by a two-to-one margin.255 They wanted
Reese’s expertise to reverse the right-to-work initiative’s lead and help organized labor to a
victory. At his suggestion, they agreed to use the Claritas system.256 Reese had only just recently
received exclusivity rights to the Claritas system.257
Reese used the ZQ index in Missouri. With the data of the resident’s tax bracket and their
consumer habits, he was able to identify the hardcore voters and softcore voters and target them
with specific messaging. He used a computer to match registered voters lists with the telephone

254

Johnson, Democracy for Hire: A History of American Political Consulting, 198.

255

Sabato, The Rise of Political Consultants: New Ways of Winning Elections, 202.

256

Sabato, The Rise of Political Consultants: New Ways of Winning Elections, 202.

257

Sabato, The Rise of Political Consultants: New Ways of Winning Elections, 202.

63

directory, after which all voters determined as unpersuadable were purged from the system.258
This left 595,000 voters in the system. Using 24,100 volunteer workers, who were primarily
recruited from organized labor, the Reese-led campaign made ten different direct mail contacts
with each of these remaining voters.259 Each letter was written in a different manner depending
on which cluster it was sent to and the concerns about right-to-work recorded in the surveys
conducted previously from that cluster.260 Reese’s grassroots volunteers and organized labor also
personally visited 360,000 homes and television, radio, and newspaper advertisements. The
organizational effort reversed the polls before the election that suggested that the right-to-work
initiative would pass. In February 1978, Hamilton’s poll concluded that sixty-three percent of
Missouri residents favored right-to-work and only thirty percent against it, with seven percent
undecided. However, in the election results in November, sixty percent of the state voted against
the initiative while forty percent voted in favor of the initiative.261
Larry Sabato, a political scientist professor at the University of Virginia, published The
Rise of Political Consultants in 1981, just a few short years after the initiative in Missouri.
Sabato makes two observations regarding the right-to-work campaign conducted by Reese. The
first is that there is an “obvious and valuable” link between macro level polling data that
identifies the persuadable voter by group and systems like Claritas.262 This has become more
relevant as more consulting firms, political and advertising, make use of similar algorithms and
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data. The systems have become more refined with newer technologies and the advent of the
internet. This allows for more methods of organization of the data clusters and an even larger
audience for the firm to reach out.
Sabato’s second point was that, of the $2.5 million spent to organize in Missouri, less
than fifteen percent were spent on television time and television ads, while fifteen percent was
spent on radio and newspaper advertisements.263 Just shy of thirty percent were spent together on
television, radio, and newspaper ads. Even by the campaign spending standards of the late 1970s,
Sabato found this lack of spending on traditional advertising shockingly low. It might have been
unusual even for the time, but it took decades after this election for television ads to target data
clusters as precise as telephone campaigns, mailings and knocking on doors. Forty years later
political campaigns could finally target television ads at households in the way that Reese was
able to target specific families through grassroots efforts such as mailings, phone calls and home
visits.
In 2014 satellite television providers, DirecTV and DISH, released a joint statement that
political TV advertisements can target their ads at the household level. The press release states
that with the same methodology of direct mail, addressable advertising allows advertisers to
reach their desired audience with accuracy.264 The deal allowed political campaigns to expand
their reach to more than twenty million homes through meticulous targeting during statewide
campaigns. Three households can watch the same show but depending on their location they can
receive distinct types of advertisements. For example, if three families tuned to watch American
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Idol live, the household in the moderate leaning conservative block would receive a commercial
supporting a conservative politician, cause or attacking a liberal politician or cause. The opposite
is true for those who live on a moderate leaning liberal block as at the same time they would also
receive a political commercial, but for a liberal politician or cause. However, the third household
might be in a solid red or solid blue neighborhood, and they will not get either advertisement at
that time since they were deemed not to be a persuadable voter.
The personalization of targeted television advertisements is an evolution of Reese’s use
of geodemography to provide his intended audience with personalized mailings and phone calls.
A modern example of this methodology can be seen in the Mentzer Media Services, which is one
of the leading political consulting firms in America. They specialize in strategic placement of
campaign commercials by purchasing airtime on behalf of its clients, deciding where, when and
how often an ad should run.265 According to their website, Mentzer Media has worked on
thousands of campaigns in every state, spending over $1 billion in media buys in its history.266
Johns Hopkins University political science professor Adam Sheingate reasoned that if an average
of 5 to 10 percent of commission on the ads that Mentzer Media placed then they have earned
between $50 and $100 million over the past several election cycles alone.267 Between Republican
and Democratic firms, firms spent over $6 billion in the 2012 election with more than half,
around $3.6 billion, going to firms that specialize in media, direct mail and digital services.268
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While more money is being spent than in the 1970s and 1980s, the type of services that Reese
provided are still prevalent today with politicians and parties paying large sums to receive the
consulting and services.
The increased usage of digital services also reflects how Reese’s use of geodemography
has translated into the modern world. For example, in 2020, internet television streaming service,
Hulu, announced they developed a tool for smaller companies to target their advertisements and
track how well their advertisements are performing. Using the Disney built software, a company
can select the start and end dates for the ad campaign, the audience that they are targeting, and
their budget. This type of geodemography targeting is crucial in the contemporary landscape as
90 percent of all thirteen to fifty-four-year-olds watch television on a streaming platform.269 The
technology that Matthew Reese helped to pioneer in the latter part of the twentieth century has
evolved and adapted to the technologies of the twenty-first century.270
Despite the first political consulting firm being co-founded by a woman, Leone Baxter,
women traditionally only served in volunteer roles. This was especially common in the midtwentieth century when the O’Brien Manual and Reese’s early days stressed that women should
be relegated to the phones, making, and sending personal mailings to households. Leadership
roles predominately belonged to men. While the restrictive nature of women’s participation in
campaigns changed little in the 1970s, it did become increasingly common for women to enter
paid roles as political consultants throughout the twentieth century. Reese’s continued
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employment of women in prominent roles in the campaigns he consulted on played a critical part
in elevating women in the field of political consulting. Since the turn of the century, women have
increasingly acquired leadership roles in the industry.271 In 2004, only 9 percent of American
Association of Political Consultants’ (AAPC) membership consisted of women. By 2014, 27
percent of the AAPC’s membership were made up of women.272
One of the most prominent women in political consulting began her career under
Matthew Reese. Nancy Todd began working with Reese in 1979.273 Like fellow Reese alum
Walter Clinton before her, Todd left Reese’s company for her own work and by the early 1990s
she worked as a political consultant for the gaming industry. In 1990, she successfully led the
campaign to legalize casinos in Mississippi, Indiana, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and New York.274
She worked on one hundred ninety-six campaigns in forty-two states and six countries and her
clients have been elected ninety-eight percent of the time.275 Todd also served as the chairwoman
and past president of the Board of Directors of the International Association of Political
Consultants and as president and chairwoman of the AAPC.276 She is also the first woman in
history to be inducted into the AAPC’s Hall of Fame.277
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Once he left political consulting, Reese joined the professional advertising business and
began working for telecommunications company AT&T. Providing political public relations
services and consultation to companies and initiatives became more common throughout the
1970s and 1980s. Alongside AT&T, Reese also worked with Chevron, United Airlines, Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, Citicorp, Georgia Power, and McDonnell Douglas.278 The work Reese
provided to these clients was similar in nature to the campaigns he ran in the 1960s and 1970s,
the difference being, according to Reese, that “the [corporate] clients leave you alone, you have
control.”279 Reese relied on grassroots efforts to provide his clients the services they desired.
These services ranged from personalized mailing advertisements to telephone blitz campaigns.
An example of these services being used came in his work with AT&T. AT&T hired
Reese in the aftermath of the federal government forcing the breakup of its telecommunication
monopoly. In the grassroots handbook that Reese prepared for the company, he categorized
AT&T as a political target for Congress, a faceless enemy.280 To counter this, Reese prepared a
multi-faceted campaign that was designed to identify, educate, persuade, and mobilize the public
and leaders on behalf of AT&T’s position. The company wanted to protect their reputation and
promote their affordable long-distance calling. To achieve these goals Reese’s company sent 6.2
million direct mail letters to 1.6 million households throughout America regarding AT&T’s
position. Personal letters were created and sent to all one hundred United State Senators.281
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Reese also assembled a volunteer force of 104,784 people to implement his campaign on behalf
of AT&T.282 Recipients of the mailings received personalized messages designed to appeal to
them. In the American heartland, families received a postcard sized mailing with a photo of the
sun setting over the countryside and a caption that reads “we were country…” and on the other
side reads “…when country wasn’t cool!”283 On the other hand, households in more urban areas
with a younger population received a postcard that was designed to look like a comic book panel
with the same information.
Much like the organization in a political campaign, Reese kept the same organizational
structure in his operations for private companies. Block captains remained a key figure in the
operation and oversaw making and sending postcards to households on behalf of his clients.
Each volunteer received their block captain kit that contained instructions on how and when to
perform their duties.284
As more former political consultants transition to corporate consulting, University of
Virginia Political Scientist Larry Sabato noticed this trend growing during the 1980s. He wrote
that most consulting firms have moved from entirely engaging in political consulting to one-third
or two-thirds of their business dealing with corporate consulting.285 Sabato also noted that
consulting forms generated more revenue consulting for corporations that they did working for
political campaigns and that long term employment was more stable in the private sector.
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Reese continued to increase his consulting efforts in the private sector prior to his
retirement but also continued to consult on some political campaigns. Before the right-to-work
initiative in 1978, Reese managed a campaign in New York for the tobacco industry that sought
to build public support for a cut in the cigarette tax.286 He then consulted with opponents of the
tobacco industry a few years later in 1980 in California where he used Claritas to analyze which
segments of California voters supported the creation of nonsmoking sections in public places.287
Adam Sheingate, political scientist at Johns Hopkins University, contended that Reese was
among the first in the industry to realize how profitable corporate work could be and others in
the industry followed his lead.288
This continued merger of political and corporate consulting also allowed the industry to
become more consolidated, with larger firms purchasing smaller firms. In 1987, Reese sold his
firm, Reese Communications Companies (RCC) and its subsidiary, Targeting Systems, Inc.
(TSI) to a British marketing firm, Wire and Plastic Products, Limited (WPP). As one of the first
consulting firm mergers, the $35 million deal stunned Reese. One year before WPP purchased
RCC, it purchased the JWT Group Inc., the parent company of J. Walter Thompson Co., what
was then the world’s fourth-largest advertising agency.289 Five years after Reese sold RCC and
TSI, the two companies grew from a combined revenue of $4.5 million to $14.4 million and their
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profit before taxes grew from $512,000 to $3.5 million.290 As of 2022, WPP is the world’s
largest advertising and public relations company generating $17 billion in annual revenues and
operates more than three hundred-fifty firms in forty-nine countries.291
At the turn of the twenty-first century, the horizontal integration of consulting firms
continued apace. The third-largest public relations firm in the world, Burson-Marsteller, was
acquired by WPP in 2000, along with its parent firm, Young & Rubicam. The two firms
provided support for the Clinton Administration prior to being sold.292 Despite initially
consulting for only Democratic political candidates, Reese’s old firm WCC soon began to take
clients from both major political parties. Some examples of WCC consulting for Republican
candidates include member of AAPC Hall of Fame, Charlie Black, who worked for President
Reagan and for both President George H. W. and George W. Bush.293 Adam Sheingate suggests
that these acquisitions by WPP and its subsidiaries point to a corporate consolidation of political
work in the United States.294 This observation is true with firms from both sides of the aisle
being owned by a single company. As Sheingate notes, public relations firms and advertising
agencies struggled to balance their client’s commercial interests with the partisan nature that
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comes with campaign consulting. However, due to consolidation, it is now possible to have
multiple firms, both Democratic and Republican in nature, to be tied to a single company.295
WPP is not alone in this effort at corporate consolidation. WPP is one of four large
companies who are consolidating with smaller firms, with the other three being Omnicom
Group, The Interpublic Group of Companies, and Publicis Groupe. Together, these four
companies own firms across the globe and make up more than half of the industry’s revenue in a
year.296 Adam Sheingate argues that the corporate consolidation of political consulting
represented a new phase in the way campaign tools are used in a broader corporate strategy.297
Burtch Drake, president and chief executive of the American Association of Advertising
Agencies, agrees saying that “if you don’t own agencies in those other fields, it comes out of
your hide,” and that conglomerate growth has been “a way to gather advertising assets under one
company to make sure you’ll keep the client’s dollar.”298 The consolidation ushered in by
Reese’s selloff has become required to grow and survive in the field.
For their clients, the services of the Big Four and others provide what Sheingate describes
as a one-stop shop.299 WPP chair, Martin Sorrell, says that “WPP can act as a portal to provide a
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single point of contact and accountability.”300 That train of thought goes back to how Martin
explained his services. The clients have access to a service that helps them in every fashion that
is desirable at any level. These clients range from anything such as Barack Obama’s presidential
campaign to Coca-Cola. Their needs can range from targeting perusable voters to advertising a
new product in a test market. Adam Sheingate suggests this development is a bully pulpit of
sorts.301
Along with the corporate consolidation of consulting firms, over the course of his career,
political consultants and their growing influence over American politics became increasingly
evident to the public. Larry Sabato’s argues in The Rise of Political Consultants that consultants
have become even bigger than the politician in some cases. He writes “a candidate’s adaptability
to the new techniques of campaigning, not his competence, has become the standard by which he
is judged by political professionals.”302 In 1996, President Bill Clinton complained to his
consultants that he did not want to read about them in the press and that he was “sick and tired”
of consultants becoming famous at his expense.303 TIME magazine ran a cover story about
Clinton consultant, Dick Morris. The cover of that issue was a picture of Clinton with a cutout
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photo of Morris on his shoulders and a caption that read “the most influential private citizen in
America.”304
Another element of Reese’s political legacy is his pioneering work in voter registration
and participation. During his time with the Democratic National Committee, Reese oversaw the
largest voter registration drive in the nation’s history. He used his preferred method of contact,
the telephone, to call millions of potential voters urging them to register to vote. Reese believed
that Kennedy won “because of the voter registration drive that happened prior to the general
election in 1960.”305 Similar registration drives occurred prior, but none to the scale or with the
technology the Reese and the DNC operated with in 1964. Expanding on the work from 1960,
Reese oversaw the registration of four million additional voters in the registration drive prior to
the 1964 election.306
The legacy of Reese’s voter registration efforts continued into the twenty-first century.
During the 2020 presidential election, Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook (now Meta), launched a
voter registration drive with the goal of registering four million voters.307 The drive was not
Facebook’s first, they had a similar large-scale registration campaign such as Rock the Vote in
2016 which registered 1.7 million voters, like that of the telephone blitz by Reese in 1964.308
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Matthew Reese’s legacy is insurmountable. He trained generations of political
consultants who are still doing business. His reliance on women workers helped more women to
move into leadership roles in the field. The field has also seen an increase of women workers
since the twenty-first century began. Additionally, Reese’s practices are felt through new
consultants as they use similar tactics and methodologies that he used. These practices have been
adapted for an increasingly digital world and make use of the technologies that are available to
them. However, Reese also changed his methods to work with the tools he had and in doing so
he became the first consultant to use data-driven software to use geodemography to better reach
his intended audiences with personalized messages. The data on geodemography that is produced
from computer software is so effective that television companies and streaming services allow
political consultants to target specific households with advertisements through their services. His
work in the private sector also inspired an increase in political consultants hired by private
companies for their geodemographic services. Reese’s efforts saw new ways that political
consultants ran campaigns and new ways for them to win.

76

CONCLUSION

Days after Matthew Reese’s passing, the surviving Kennedy brother, Ted, drafted a letter
and sent his condolences to Reese’s wife, Martha. In the letter, Kennedy expressed his deepest
sympathy, and that the Kennedy family were proud of his leadership, grateful for his friendship,
and will forever miss him.309 Kennedy also revealed that his brother John held Reese in
extremely high regard, especially after his tireless work in the 1960 West Virginia primary. “In a
very real sense, Matt helped lay the foundation for the New Frontier,” Ted Kennedy wrote, “Jack
couldn’t have won without him.”310 In many ways, Matt Reese did help usher in a New Frontier.
He helped Kennedy become president, but he also revolutionized political consulting.
The mid twentieth century saw the growth of professional political consulting at a rapid
pace. This growth changed how politics were conducted then and shaped how they are conducted
today. It also saw private businesses begin employing the same political consultants and tactics
to grow their advertising. It is in essence a modern-day bully pulpit. The complexities of the
growing and changing field were navigated by Matthew Reese. Recognized for his contributions
to the field’s early history and development into the multimedia giant that it is today, Reese was
heralded as “The Godfather of Modern Political Consulting” by The Washington Post upon his
death.
The emergence of professional political consulting served as a natural evolution as
political parties moved away from machines and party bosses. This evolution can be observed
for the first time as a response by Campaigns Inc. to stop Upton Sinclair’s bid to be governor of
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California in the 1930s. However, it was not until the 1960s that other firms other than
Campaigns Inc. began to adopt their practices to provide consulting to politicians and campaigns.
Matthew Reese was among the first to enter the field as it grew beyond California during this
time. The profession reached new heights during this time. It saw the introduction of computer
software to spread the grassroots efforts in which Reese was the first professional political
consultant to use. The same methods and technologies used when Reese shifted his focus from
political consulting to consulting businesses.
Reese began his consulting career in the 1960 West Virginia primary and was heavily
influenced by Larry O’Brien’s philosophies and carried it with him throughout his career. The
primary is one of the most recognizable elections in modern history where John Kennedy
defeated Hubert Humphrey and demonstrated to the nation that he can overcome the Catholic
issue that surrounded his campaign. It also displayed that Reese’s contributions to the campaign
were crucial in propelling Kennedy to victory. Reese was hired onto a high-ranking position in
the state’s campaign leadership, the Executive Director of Citizens for Kennedy in West
Virginia. Reese employed the philosophies of the O’Brien Manual in West Virginia, starting
grassroots tactics he regularly made use of throughout his career. He helped Kennedy secure the
nominations of high-profile Democratic leaders, an issue that the Kennedy campaign faced in the
buildup to the 1960 election. He organized campaign events and assisted in defusing the issue
with Kennedy’s religion. The work in West Virginia landed him a job at the Democratic National
Committee, which spring boarded him into his political consulting career.
When Reese began his career, he was still computing information by calculator and hand
and by the time he retired, he was the first to harness computer software that streamlined the
work and made it more accurate. With computer software he was able to enhance
78

geodemography, the linking of demographics and geography to better present his message. At
the same time, he also led the industry into the private sector by being the first to supply his
services to private companies. Additionally, when he sold his firm to Wire and Plastic Products
(WPP) he was one the earliest in the industry to sell their firm to a much larger conglomerate.
The acquisitions of firms into much larger companies to gobble up their services as a one stop
shop for everything has become common during the twilight of the twentieth century and
throughout the twentieth-first century.
This new and current stage of political operations relies heavily on the practices
established by political consultants in the mid twentieth century. In the Digital Age, people are
more accessible thanks to the advent of social media and smart devices that keep them in touch
with the world around them. This makes the use of geodemography even more prevalent since
data pulled from one’s digital footprint makes them an easier target for consulting companies.
The continued use of systems such as the PRIZM (Potential Rating Index by ZIP Markets) index
and Claritas shows their effectiveness and that their use is like how it operated in the 1970s when
used by Reese. Companies such as DirecTV and DISH provide services that let consultants and
campaigns emulate the geodemography methods of targeting their intended audience, much like
Reese targeted undecided voters with specific messages. The ability for a consulting or
advertising firm to reach its intended audience has never been easier.
The accessibility of one and their data and by big marketing and consulting firms can be
worrisome. Scholars Larry Sabato and Adam Sheingate both recognized the trouble it can cause
with ethics and raises concerns of corruption.311 The goal of such firms is to make as much

311

See Larry Sabato’s The Rise of Political Consultants: New Ways of Winning Elections and Adam
Sheingate’s Building a Business of Politics: The Rise of Political Consulting and the Transformation of American
Democracy.

79

money as possible. More money is used on advertising and political campaigns now than it was
in the 1970s and 1980s. Despite these concerns, more money will continue to be spent on
consulting and as Sheingate duly notes that across the political spectrum and all levels of
government, few candidates try for office without the services of a professional political
consultant and even fewer succeed without one.312
Scholarship exists on political consulting, but no such scholarship examined Reese’s
legacy on the profession. Such scholarship is necessary because it provides the context for a
business that impacts everyday life and is heavily involved in politics and business. It is now a
necessity for a business planning to advertise to hire professional consultants or a politician
running a campaign to also hire professional consultants. Several of these consultants are alumni
of Reese’s firms and follow him in their work. As a result, this scholarship helps to close the gap
that existed in the history of political consulting.
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